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REPLAY THAT TUNE: DEFENDING BAKKE ON 
STARE DECISIS GROUNDS 
CHARLES ADSIDE, III  
ABSTRACT 
The announcement from the United States Supreme Court to reconsider Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I)1 presents an opportunity to revisit Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke, which controls affirmative action 
jurisprudence. This Article argues that Bakke is immune from reversal under stare 
decisis principles, because the use of race in admission programs is deeply engrained 
in our constitutional law. The Court's race ideologues seek, however, to alter Bakke 
to reflect their vision of racial equality. In Fisher II, the Court should not change its 
jurisprudence to reflect any doctrinal extreme. 
Arguing that Bakke was incorrectly decided is not enough to justify reversal. 
Stare decisis doctrine requires that opponents offer a prudential reason to overturn it. 
Removing racial preferences from university admissions would devastate higher 
education. Bakke sparked the creation of bureaucracies at universities that steer 
diverse students to pursue enrollment. Moreover, reversal would unsettle workable 
rules that guide higher education in this area. Not only is the stability of affirmative 
action doctrine at stake, but the future of race-relations is also in play. 
Many argue that a strictly color-blind approach to affirmative action will foster 
racial harmony. However, the movement to enact this theory at the state level has 
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 1  Fisher I and Fisher II both involve challenges to the University of Texas at Austin’s 
affirmative action admission plan. In Fisher I, the Court, in a 7-1 decision, held that the 
district court and the Fifth Circuit did not apply correctly strict scrutiny in upholding the 
University’s admission plan. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013). 
The Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to apply the correct standard. Id. The Fifth 
Circuit, purporting to apply the Court’s prescribed scrutiny, again upheld the University’s 
admission plan. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 659-660 (5th Cir. 2014). The 
Court then granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the University’s plan. Fisher 
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015) (Fisher II). 
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short-circuited the debate by denying all sides the opportunity to express their 
concerns on race policy. Bakke reinforces democratic values by permitting society to 
craft policies designed to improve racial health. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Stare decisis is the most powerful doctrine in American legal history. It 
commands that jurisprudence is followed and that law is consistently applied from 
case to case. Despite the idea that a judge should respect the decisions of his or her 
predecessors, there are moments when precedent no longer fits society’s 
expectations and the Court concludes that a doctrinal shift is required. As a result, 
legendary decisions emerge, spawning new principles that develop into canons 
whose constitutionality become unassailable over time. Such is the prominence of 
these decisions in our legal culture that they carry as much force as either the Bill of 
Rights or an amendment to the Constitution. Precedent that recognized 
unenumerated rights, legal tender, and even the administrative state so 
fundamentally changed the legal, economic, and political landscape of this nation 
that ordinary citizens cannot imagine society operating free from their influence.2 
Departure from these landmark cases would not only outrage the public but would be 
blasphemous to judges as well; therefore, lawyers are careful to advance their claims 
in concert with the principles enshrined in these jurisprudential icons.  
But the fact that a decision has been followed repeatedly does not explain why it 
should be. The Court does, in fact, reverse precedent.3 So, there is precedent that the 
Court will overturn while there are others that are shielded from reversal. This begs a 
couple of questions: what distinguishes cases that are immune to reconsideration 
from those that are not? More specifically, how does a case whose ruling the 
Framers did even not intend become as powerful as the most revered clauses of the 
Constitution? A helpful comparison between music hits and Supreme Court 
precedent provides an insightful answer. The way a case receives notoriety as a 
doctrinal idol in legal culture is similar to how songs become engrained in popular 
culture. 
Listeners tune into shows on radio, TV, and the Internet, giving them quick 
access to both ancient and modern popular music. These forums also introduce fans 
to popular talent and music show hosts, like Casey Kasem and Ryan Seacrest, who 
provide expert analysis on all genres ranging from rock to country and hip-hop. 
                                                           
 2  Jed Rubenfeld, Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 740-747 (1989) (explaining 
Supreme Court jurisprudence where it recognized unmentioned rights in the Constitution); 
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 497 (1871) (holding that paper money did not violate the 
Constitution); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)  (holding a state 
minimum wage law as constitutional and thus overturned the Lochner doctrine that 
established economic substantive due process). 
 3  Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating minimum wage law 
for women and children on due process grounds as violation of liberty of contract), overruled 
in part by West Coast v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
experienced a similar transformation in the last century when the Court in Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), reversed Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Katz 
rejected Olmstead’s holding that unwarranted telephone wiretapping by police officials did 
not violate the Constitution. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
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Through the years, certain songs and albums become artistic standards.4 New 
listeners continue to enjoy these tunes and artists return to these works to inspire 
their own unique creations. Although these iconic songs no longer play on 
“America's Top 40,” “oldies” stations continue to remind its listeners of the 
importance of these tunes; their rhythmic, melodic, and thematic structures still 
influence the creation of new music. Similarly, lawyers, judges, and law professors 
cite to certain foundational cases that set the tone, much like a top hit, for challenges 
against government policy. Let us review a few examples. First, with the help of 
popular crime television shows, Miranda v. Arizona5 has become an embedded 
feature of our national life. Nearly every citizen remembers and can recite the so-
called Miranda warnings verbatim if asked. In addition law students are required and 
forced to rehearse key concepts from landmark decisions in class. Second, when law 
students hear about a challenge over a religious display under the Establishment 
Clause, they instantly recall Lemon v. Kurtzman and the infamous three-pronged 
Lemon test.6 There are other classics, to be sure. 
In addition to “top-hit” cases, there are jurisprudential doctrines that are also 
engrained in every law student and lawyer’s memory. Take for example, the three-
tiers of review for the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause. These tiers are like 
lyrics that have been rehearsed by every person who has studied the law. Possible 
violations of fundamental rights or the use of suspect classifications make lawyers 
recall the verses from the doctrine of strict scrutiny review. That doctrine is an “oldie 
but goodie” in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which demands that 
government measures that either infringe on fundamental rights or target a suspect 
classification “are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that 
further compelling governmental interests.”7 They can also repeat a mantra, which 
some Justices echo in affirmative action decisions. “Strict scrutiny must not be,” 
they assert, “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”8 The Court’s affirmative action 
jurisprudence—a line of cases in the Court’s race cannon—has a top hit, or 
precedent, whose rhythm all affirmative action decisions claim to follow.  
It has been nearly four decades since Justice Powell, in his decisive opinion in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, announced the principle, which 
guides race-conscious admission programs today: “The diversity that furthers a 
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and 
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important 
element.”9 The Court reaffirmed this rule on three occasions in Grutter v. 
                                                           
 4  For example, “Fortunate Son” is the anthem of Vietnam War protest. "Billie Jean" 
embodies ‘80s pop music. And N.W.A's Straight Outta Compton has lasting power as the 
pioneering album of “gangsta rap.” 
 5  384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that officers inform citizens of their rights when 
they are placed in police custody prior to interrogation. Id. at 444-45. 
 6  403 U.S. 602 (1971). Students also recite principles in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, which hold that those factors are evaluated through the perspective of an 
“objective observer” who can discern whether the display endorses or disapproves of religion. 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 7  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 8  Id. at 237. 
 9  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978). 
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Bollinger,10 Gratz v. Bollinger,11 and again in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
(Fisher I).12 However, this does not calm the impassioned doctrinal debate between 
the Court’s race ideologues.  
Fervent proponents of race-conscious constitutionalism desire to alter affirmative 
action rules to require deference to color-conscious government action designed to 
ameliorate the perceived effects of “an overtly discriminatory past.”13 Colorblind 
purists, on the other doctrinal extreme, advocate for a strictly colorblind constitution, 
that is, a wholesale rejection of race-conscious government activity.14 Some purists, 
in fact, believe that the doctrine of strict scrutiny review is insufficient to protect 
citizens from invidious racial discrimination.15 
As illustrated in Fisher I, the Justices divided themselves along predictable, 
ideological lines, advancing their respective visions of racial equality. In Fisher I, 
Justice Thomas stated again his intention to recalibrate the Court’s jurisprudence to 
follow a strictly colorblind approach to affirmative action policy: “The constitution 
abhors classifications based on race because every time the government places 
citizens on racial registers and makes races relevant in the provision of burdens or 
                                                           
 10  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 11  539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 12  133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 13  Id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 14  Justices Scalia and Thomas contended that campus diversity could never serve as a 
compelling state interest to justify racial discrimination. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-
provided education is no exception.”) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part)); id. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A] State's use of race in 
higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection 
Clause.”). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have written opinions that appear to support 
a strictly colorblind constitution. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 598-605 (2009) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (describing the denial of certification exam results for vacancies at a 
local fire department as influenced by racial politics); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). It must be noted that the vacancy 
on the Supreme Court caused by Justice Scalia’s recent death raises the possibility that the 
Court may not provide a clear answer in Fisher II. Whoever occupies his seat may determine 
the direction of the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence in the future.  
 15  John Marquez Lundin, The Call for Color-Blind Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
407, 424-25 (1997) (“In many important ways the law has undergone significant changes in 
the time since Plessy. While de facto racial discrimination still exists, de jure discrimination is 
generally a thing of the past. Both the Black Codes, which prompted the Reconstruction 
Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, and the repressive Jim 
Crow laws upheld in Plessy have long since been repealed. Yet, in fundamental ways, the law 
has not changed. The principle established in Plessy— that the law may distinguish between 
citizens because of their race—remains. While the Court subjects race-conscious laws to strict 
scrutiny and requires that they be justified by a compelling government interest, one need look 
no further than Korematsu, where this test was applied, to see that the courts can be subject to 
the same passions and prejudices as legislatures.”). 
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benefits, it demeans us all.”16 In her dissent, however, Justice Ginsburg mocked 
colorblind constitutionalism in whole, suggesting that the Court’s preference for 
race-neutral alternatives is a sleight of hand: “I have said before and reiterate here 
that only an ostrich,” she wrote, “could regard the supposedly neutral alternatives as 
race unconscious.”17 Indeed, these “lyrics” are representative of the ideological sides 
in affirmative action opinions, and each side was practiced and mimicked in Fisher I. 
However, the ideologues added nothing insightful to the debate. In order to address 
the fundamental questions at the heart of constitutional adjudication, both ideological 
sides of affirmative action jurisprudence must be analyzed through a broader 
constitutional framework.  
Despite the debate between colorblind purists and race-conscious ideologues, this 
Article finds that neither side has made a case that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke 
fails to serve our legal system’s need for “consistency, stability, predictability, and 
societal reliance” that respect for precedent is calculated to accomplish.18 Because 
race ideologues, like Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, do not give Justice Powell’s 
opinion weight in affirmative action jurisprudence, this Article will show that the 
opinion carries sufficient purchase in the First Amendment canon to control judicial 
scrutiny over race-conscious admission programs. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I argues that the First Amendment provides 
sufficient grounds to allow higher education to use race classifications in order to 
achieve freedom of expression. Part I examines Bakke on its merits to determine 
whether it comports with the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire and Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of New 
York. This Part then examines and responds to the criticisms of Bakke, ultimately 
concluding that Bakke is not an erroneous decision and does not require 
reconsideration by the Court. Part II finds that Bakke should not be reversed because 
it is protected under the stare decisis doctrine. This Part aims to prove that Bakke 
does not meet any of the four considerations required to overturn precedent, because 
Bakke is both workable and reliable. Part III then analyzes why adherence to Bakke 
benefits democracy and eases race-tensions that are currently hindering our nation. 
Finally, this Article concludes by identifying options for our country to consider in 
the current public debate over affirmative action. 
I. FREE SPEECH CLAUSE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND BAKKE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE DIVERSITY DOCTRINE 
Some scholars contend that academic freedom, the canonical parent to the 
diversity doctrine, lacks textual or historical roots in the First Amendment to allow 
colleges to use racial classifications in order to achieve its interest in free expression. 
But a more careful look at Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke shows that his 
reasoning is not a radical departure from Free Speech principles. 
                                                           
 16  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  
 17  Id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 18  Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1206 (2006).  
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This Part first examines Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke on the merits19 by 
critically analyzing whether Bakke’s reasoning comports with Free Speech 
jurisprudence as articulated in Sweezy and Keyishian. Justice Powell employed those 
decisions as the basis for the diversity doctrine, which identified a compelling state 
interest in student body diversity under the Equal Protection Clause. This Part then 
entertains substantive criticisms leveled against Bakke.  
A. Sweezy, Keyishian, and Bakke: Marxists, Classrooms, and Student Body 
Diversity 
1. Sweezy v. New Hampshire 
a. The Plurality Opinion  
At the height of Cold War hysteria, Socialist, and Marxist economist, Paul 
Sweezy lectured on three occasions at the University of New Hampshire on Marxist 
ideology.20 He also wrote an article, where he predicted that socialistic movements 
would overthrow capitalist governments like the United States.21 The state attorney 
general summoned Sweezy, pursuant to the New Hampshire Subversive Activities 
Act, to answer questions concerning his lectures, his political ideology, and his 
membership in the Communist and Progressive Parties.22 The Act barred “subversive 
persons” from public employment, including state universities, and outlawed 
“subversive organizations” from operating in New Hampshire.23 The Act also 
empowered the attorney general to subpoena witnesses or documents, petition the 
courts to hold witnesses in contempt, and decide what witnesses, documents, and 
evidence were relevant to the legislative investigation on subversive activities.24 
Sweezy cooperated by answering questions and volunteering information; however, 
he refused to answer questions about the content of his lectures or his knowledge 
about the Progressive Party.25 As a consequence, a New Hampshire state court jailed 
Sweezy for contempt of court.26 
In Sweezy, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court struck down the New 
Hampshire Subversive Activities Act, because it violated Sweezy’s Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights.27 Additionally, the Court found that the Act 
                                                           
 19  If a reviewing court concludes that a precedent is correct on the merits, then it will 
simply reaffirm the decision and follow it without consulting stare decisis. See Randy J. 
Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Review, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 417 n.27 (2010) 
(quoting Richard H. Fallon, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional 
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 570 (2001) (“If a court believes a prior decision to be 
correct, it can reaffirm that decision on the merits without reference to stare decisis.”)). 
 20  Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 242 (1957). 
 21  Id. at 236-38. 
 22  Id. at 236. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. at 238. 
 25  Id. at 243. 
 26  Id. at 244-45. 
 27  Id. at 254-55. 
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infringed upon broader protections afforded to Sweezy under the Free Speech 
Clause.28 The Court found it alarming that the Act delegated a “sweeping and 
uncertain mandate” to the attorney general in selecting what witnesses were 
summoned, what questions were asked, and what kinds of evidence demanded.29 
Such broad discretion, the Court concluded, empowered the attorney general to 
gather information that was not needed to identify subversive activity and thus 
enabled the attorney general “to screen the citizenry of New Hampshire to bring to 
light anyone who fits into the expansive definitions.”30  
But the Act went beyond denial of due process protection. The legislative 
investigation also burdened the academic freedom and political expression exercised 
by scholars and political activists. In a brief discussion, the Court reasoned that an 
investigation that scrutinized an individual’s beliefs and associations could stifle the 
exchange of information critical to expression in a democratic society.31 The Court 
stated that freedom of expression is paramount in the college and university setting, 
because these institutions serve a truth-finding function in the nation’s Free Speech 
traditions.32 Colleges and universities, like the University of New Hampshire, are 
places where students develop skills that better prepare them for democratic 
participation.33 Therefore, the Court found that when the government inquires into 
the content of lectures, beliefs, and associations, it impairs this function because 
“[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers 
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain 
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”34 
While the plurality employed the Due Process Clause to invalidate the Act, the 
opinion offered new insight into the reach of the Free Speech Clause into academic 
activity as a First Amendment concern. Justice Frankfurter elaborated on this subject 
in greater detail in his concurring opinion.  
b. Justice Frankfurter’s Concurring Opinion: The Four Freedoms  
Justice Frankfurter agreed that the Act violated Sweezy’s due process rights; 
however, his opinion focused primarily on academic freedom.35 In his opinion, 
Justice Frankfurter contended it was self-evident that a “free society” depended upon 
“free universities,” requiring “the exclusion of governmental intervention in the 
intellectual life of a university.”36 To Justice Frankfurter, academic freedom would 
flourish when members of the academic community possessed political autonomy 
from government intrusion. As Justice Frankfurter stated: 
                                                           
 28  Id. at 254. 
 29  Id. at 253. 
 30  Id. at 253. 
 31  Id. at 250. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. at 250-51.  
 34  Id. at 250.  
 35  Id. at 250. 
 36  Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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The problems that are the respective preoccupations of anthropology, 
economics, law, psychology, sociology and related areas of scholarship 
are merely departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of 
analysis, with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For 
society's good—if understanding be an essential need of society—
inquiries into these problems, speculations about them, stimulation in 
others of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible.37 
To achieve this end, institutions of higher learning must remain free from 
government interference. Quoting from South African scholars, Justice Frankfurter 
famously identified, and fused, the so-called “four freedoms” to the Free Speech 
canon: 
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most 
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in 
which there prevail `the four essential freedoms' of a university—to 
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.38  
Justice Frankfurter found that the Act interfered with academic freedom when the 
attorney general intruded into Sweezy’s “political autonomy” when he asked him 
about; (1) the contents of his lectures, (2) membership in political parties, and (3) the 
political activities of others.39 In Justice Frankfurter’s opinion academic freedom was 
protected under the Constitution and therefore state laws compelling academics to 
disclose his or her political ideology violated his or her First Amendment rights.40 
Ten years later, the Court would be presented with yet another First Amendment 
challenge to academic admissions in Keyishian.41  
2. Keyishian v. Board of Regents 
Similar to the statute challenged in Sweezy, Keyishian reviewed the 
constitutionality of New York’s Feinberg Law (“Feinberg Law”),42 which directed 
the State Board of Regents to compile a list of “subversive” organizations, which 
were defined as: “organizations which advocate the doctrine of overthrow of 
government by force, violence, or any unlawful means.”43 Members of these 
organizations could be disqualified from public employment as a result of the 
Feinberg Law.44  
Under the Feinberg Law, the Board identified the Communist Party as a 
subversive organization and demanded that all employees sign a certificate affirming 
                                                           
 37  Id. at 261-62. 
 38  Id. at 263 (emphasis added). 
 39  Id. at 265-66. 
 40  Id. at 267. 
 41  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 591 (1967). 
 42  N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3022 (McKinney); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 105 (McKinney).  
 43  Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 594. 
 44  Id.  
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they were not members of the Communist Party as a pre-condition to employment.45 
Five faculty and staff members at the University of Buffalo refused to sign the 
certificate; as a consequence, the University dismissed them and threatened to 
terminate their employment.46  
In Keyishian, the Court held the Feinberg Law was unconstitutionally vague 
because it allowed educational elites to suppress academic and political freedoms in 
and outside of the classroom.47 Specifically, the Court focused on the language of 
section 105 of the Feinberg Law. Section 105 barred employment to any person who 
“by word of mouth or writing willfully and deliberately advocates, advises or teaches 
the doctrine of forcible government overthrow.”48 It also required dismissal of an 
employee if he or she was involved in “the distribution of written material 
‘containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine of forceful overthrow, 
and who himself advocates, advises, teaches, or embraces the duty, necessity or 
propriety of adopting the doctrine contained therein.’”49 Further, section 105 
disqualified “any person who advocates the overthrow of government by force.”50 
The Court found these provisions rendered the Feinberg Law unconstitutionally 
vague because these provisions were extraordinarily ambiguous and “[m]en of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application.”51  
Given the vagueness of these provisions, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, 
found these provisions were vulnerable to “sweeping and improper application” and 
thus could “prohibit the employment of one who merely advocates the doctrine in 
the abstract, without any attempt to indoctrinate others or incite others to action in 
furtherance of unlawful aims.”52 Justice Brennan offered a parade of horribles to 
illustrate the point. For example, a “teacher who carrie[d] a copy of the Communist 
Manifesto on a public street” would be committing “criminal anarchy.”53 He further 
questioned whether the statute barred the teaching of the “histories of the evolution 
of Marxist doctrine or tracing the background of the French, American, or Russian 
revolutions” in the classroom.54 The Feinberg Law’s uncertain scope, Justice 
Brennan found, adversely affected the teaching profession and thus prohibited the 
“free play of the spirit which all teachers . . . cultivate and practice.”55  
The Feinberg Law not only restricted the scholarship of individual instructors, 
but it also chilled “academic freedom,” which the Court found was a “special 
                                                           
 45  Id. at 595-96.  
 46  Id. at 592-93. 
 47  Id. at 601-02. 
 48  Id. at 599 (citing N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 105(1)(b) (McKinney)). 
 49  Id. at. 600; see also N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 105 (McKinney). 
 50  Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604. 
 51  Id. at 604 (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964)). 
 52  Id. at 599-600. 
 53  Id. at 599. 
 54  Id. at 601 
 55  Id.  
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concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom.”56 Here, Justice Brennan pointed to intellectual 
exchanges within the classroom as integral to that freedom which provides a 
“marketplace of ideas” to students.57 Because the Feinberg Law restricted the range 
of subjects taught by instructors, Justice Brennan identified the classroom as the 
mechanism in which colleges achieve their truth-finding function in First 
Amendment jurisprudence: “The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of 
a multitude of tongues’ [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.”58 
In order to link the classroom as the marketplace of ideas to academic freedom, he 
cited directly to Sweezy for support: 
“The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is 
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a 
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To 
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and 
universities would imperil the future of our Nation.”59  
In both Sweezy and Keyishian the Court struck down far-reaching laws restricting 
intellectual exchanges in the classroom by identifying academic freedom as a liberty 
interest under the First Amendment.  
Both cases endorse academic freedom at colleges and universities, because these 
institutions train citizens and future leaders in developing truth-finding skills that are 
essential to democratic participation.60 However, Keyishian took the reasoning 
behind academic freedom a step further. The Court characterized the classroom 
dynamic, which provides the opportunity for the exchange of ideas among students, 
as the mechanism in which truth can be discovered. Thus, any law that interfered 
with such exchanges infringed upon academic freedom. Justice Brennan’s 
observations along with Sweezy provided the doctrinal foundation for the diversity 
doctrine established in Bakke. 
3. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
Bakke involved a challenge to a race-conscious admissions program, which 
produced a splintered decision; four Justices found the program was constitutional61 
and four Justices invalidated the program wholesale.62 Those Justices finding that the 
program was constitutional based their conclusion on the theory that government 
officials should be given deference when employing racial classifications aimed at 
                                                           
 56  Id. at 603. 
 57  Id.  
 58  Id.  
 59  Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)). 
 60  Id.  
 61  Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324-386 (1978) (Brennan, 
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 62  Id. at 408-421 (Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, JJ., & Burger, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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ameliorating the perceived effects of past discrimination against racial minorities.63 
As Justice Brennan wrote, “[g]overnment may take race into account when it acts 
not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on 
minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been 
made by judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in this 
area.”64 Whereas those Justices stating the program was invalid argued that it 
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.65 This left Justice Powell’s opinion 
as decisive in resolving the case, and pivotal in identifying the standard that would 
control review over race-conscious admission programs.66  
Bakke reviewed an admissions policy at the University of California Medical 
School at Davis. The program had a two-tracked admissions system. Most 
candidates were evaluated through the regular admissions program while 
underrepresented racial minorities were also eligible for a special admissions 
program.67 That program reserved sixteen out of one hundred seats for minority 
applicants and did not evaluate them against candidates in the regular admissions 
process.68 Justice Powell reviewed the constitutionality of the program under strict 
scrutiny, because the Court’s Equal Protection doctrine considers all racial 
classifications, regardless of the group targeted, as inherently suspect.69  
Applying strict scrutiny review, Justice Powell examined if the medical school 
possessed a compelling state interest to justify its race-conscious admission policy.70 
Justice Powell’s decision at this point appeared largely mainstream, even 
unremarkable, because he rejected claimed justifications for race-conscious 
government action that the Court dismissed in prior decisions.71 Justice Powell’s 
discussion took an unusual turn, however, when he consulted First Amendment 
cases—materials outside Equal Protection jurisprudence—to identify a compelling 
state interest to justify the use of race in college admissions.72 Consistent with the 
reasoning articulated in Sweezy and Keyishian, Justice Powell found that colleges 
                                                           
 63  Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 64  Id. at 325.  
 65  Id. at 412-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 forbade any program, which received federal funds from excluding any person on 
the basis of race. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(h)(6) (2012)). 
 66  Mark S. Kende, Is Bakke Now a Super-Precedent and Does It Matter?, 16 J. CONST. L. 
ONLINE 15, 19 n.32 (2013).  
 67  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274. 
 68  Id. at 275.  
 69  Id. at 290, 294-95. 
 70  Id. at 307. 
 71  Id. at 310. Justice Powell rejected justifications for race-conscious government action 
in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367–376 (1977), United Jewish Orgs. of 
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 155–156 (1977), and South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).   
 72  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. 
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played a unique role in our First Amendment traditions, which made academic 
freedom a special concern.73  
Justice Powell took the Court’s academic freedom doctrine a step further by 
identifying the process upon which colleges select students (i.e., admission 
programs) as a method for providing a market place of ideas to its students.74 Justice 
Powell reasoned that diversity-oriented programs, which holistically evaluate an 
individual applicant for admission, are used to create classroom environments that 
allow students to engage in speculation, experimentation, and creation on campus.75 
Race, he concluded, could be used as an ingredient in campus diversity.76  
Any use of race, Justice Powell explained, must be narrowly tailored if it is used 
as “only one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in 
attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body.”77 On a doctrinal level, Justice 
Powell’s opinion fused the First Amendment with the Equal Protection Clause, 
transforming litigation over admission policies into hybrid cases. As a result, courts 
today must balance the college’s interest in academic freedom against an individual 
applicant’s protection from government sponsored racial discrimination by screening 
the challenged policy through strict scrutiny.78  
B. A Critical Look at Justice Powell’s Bakke Opinion on Its Merits 
This Part explores salient criticisms of Justice Powell’s opinion and places them 
under three main categories. Part I.B. lays out three arguments against Bakke. Part 
I.C. responds to these criticisms. I conclude that Bakke is not clearly erroneous to 
require reconsideration of the Court’s entire affirmative action jurisprudence. The 
decision fits within the First Amendment canon. 
1. Textual and Historical Criticisms 
 One potent criticism of Justice Powell’s opinion is that academic freedom, the 
doctrinal basis for the diversity principle, is not a legitimate liberty interest under the 
Free Speech Clause. Sweezy and Keyishian, as the critique goes, did not cite to any 
textual or historical evidence to support the existence of this freedom. Rather, both 
opinions evoked conclusory, yet rhetorically appealing, statements as a substitute for 
constitutional evidence: “The essentiality of freedom in the community of American 
universities is almost self-evident, No one should underestimate the vital role in a 
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth.”79 Yet, the missing 
note in this score is the evidence that explains why the freedom is regarded as an 
“essentiality,” that is, a fundamental ingredient in the exercise of political rights.  
                                                           
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. at 317. 
 75  Id.  
 76  Id.  
 77  Id. at 314. 
 78  Id.  
 79  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).  
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Professor Horwitz suggests that Justice Powell’s focus on this language missed 
the point entirely.80 The fact that Sweezy and Keyishian spilled little ink on this 
matter—he suggests—shows that those cases did not intend for academic freedom to 
be taken seriously.81 Bakke’s brief analysis of these opinions, to develop an interest 
in student body diversity as a related interest to academic freedom, overlooked the 
fact that the holdings in Sweezy and Keyishian did not rest on that doctrine at all.82 
Academic freedom was—Horwitz argues—entirely unessential to the holdings.83 
The Court invalidated the laws in Sweezy and Keyishian, because they were vague 
and enabled education elites to suppress core political speech.84 Discussion on 
academic freedom was, therefore, incidental in those cases.85  
2. Workability Criticisms  
Another contention against Bakke is that academic freedom, as presented in 
Sweezy and Keyishian, is not concretely defined to give adequate guidance to courts 
for two reasons.86 First, the doctrine does not identify who or what it protects. There 
is language in Sweezy and Keyishian that indicates the doctrine safeguards 
individuals like teachers or students.87 But institutions, like colleges and universities, 
could exercise the right based on a broader reading of those cases.88 Judges are thus 
left to wonder if they can adjudicate claims asserted only by individuals or by 
institutions.89  
Secondly, the cases do not precisely describe the scope of the freedom they 
identify. This leaves reviewing courts with no cohesive theory to explain the 
doctrine’s role in the Court’s overall Free Speech jurisprudence. It is crucial for 
constitutional theories to be clearly defined, because it gives direction to judges on 
how to both monitor government action designed to suppress fundamental rights and 
expose potential infringements on those rights. Unfortunately, no unified theory is 
offered in academic freedom cases.  
While Sweezy, Keyishian, and Bakke all recognize that academic freedom 
provides a truth-finding function in preparing students for democratic participation, 
Keyishian and Bakke identify two other functions that are essential for the 
meaningful exercise of that right.90 Keyishian found that the classroom dynamic 
provided a “multitude of tongues” or the “robust exchange of ideas,” which aided 
                                                           
 80  Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 492 (2005). 
 81  Id. at 493. 
 82  Id. at 488. 
 83  Id. at 492-93. 
 84  Id. at 487. 
 85  Id.  
 86  Id.  
 87  Id. at 485. 
 88  Id.  
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. at 489. 
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students in their quest for truth.91 Bakke concludes that Keyishian provides the basis 
for another interest that facilitated intellectual exchanges in the classroom, that is, 
campus diversity.92 The problem is Keyishian and Bakke identified interests (i.e., 
intellectual exchanges and campus diversity) that are not at the heart of academic 
freedom, but are supplemental to it. The logic taken in these cases provide no 
principle, which can be neutrally applied, to cabin the doctrine. Yet it is not entirely 
clear, as some argue,93 that a broad reading of academic freedom reaches admission 
programs. 
3. Bakke Cannot Be Expanded to Admissions Programs 
Assuming, for argument’s sake, that academic freedom is a legitimate liberty 
interest, the academic freedom doctrine does not reach Bakke. As previously 
explained,94 Sweezy and Keyishian involved state laws that filtered out university 
faculty and staff based upon political viewpoints. Justice Frankfurter’s concurring 
opinion in Sweezy, devoted a considerable amount of analysis to the “extensive 
questioning” and the “exhaustive scope” of the inquiry into Sweezy’s political 
beliefs.95 Bakke, on the other hand, did not involve any direct regulation of speech 
uttered in the classroom.96 Rather, Bakke involved race-conscious programs that 
trigger the suspect classification canon that emanates from Equal Protection 
jurisprudence.97  
That canon, it could be argued, is entirely unrelated to the facts in Sweezy or 
Keyishian. Those cases did not involve admission programs, let alone the use of race 
in admission decisions.98 Thus, Justice Powell’s opinion pulled the academic 
freedom doctrine beyond its context.99 Both Sweezy and Keyishian pointed to the 
truth-seeking role institutions of higher learning provided in training students for 
political expression. Bakke linked diversity—without any specific support—to 
academic freedom without explaining how classroom diversity, and more 
specifically ethnic diversity, is necessary to prepare students for democratic 
participation.100  
                                                           
 91  Id.  
 92  Id. at 492. 
 93  Id. at 492-93. 
 94  Id. at 488. 
 95  Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 257 (1957).  
 96  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 273-76 (1978). 
 97  Id. at 287-288.  
 98  Horwitz, supra note 80, at 492 n.158. 
 99  Id. at 492. 
 100  Id. at 493. 
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C. Bakke Revisited: A Closer Look at the Merits 
1. Academic Freedom as a Non-Textual Right Under the Free Speech Clause 
Presents Few Constitutional Difficulties  
a. Academic Freedom as an Implied Right  
Although academic freedom is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the 
Court has historically announced other canons that recognize unspecified rights 
arising from the Bill of Rights.101 The Constitution affords citizens autonomy from 
government regulation in an array of areas.102 In keeping with this tradition, the 
Court has developed doctrines under the First Amendment identifying non-textual 
rights that allow citizens to explore the full range of human expression.103 The 
                                                           
 101  Id. at 494. 
 102  The doctrine of substantive due process expanded the meaning of “liberty” in the Due 
Process Clause. Today, liberty means more than “fair process” and “the absence of physical 
restraint.” See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). Over the years, the Court 
identified unspecified rights in the Constitution under the Due Process Clause. These rights 
include the freedom of parents to control their children’s education free from government 
intrusion. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 263 
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Liberty also protects the right to 
procreate, to access contraception, to abort a fetus prior to viability outside the womb, to 
marry, and to refuse medical treatment. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming Roe v. Wade’s essential holding that recognized a woman's right to 
choose an abortion before fetal viability); Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 
U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) 
(holding that the right to marry is a fundamental right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) (holding that the Connecticut law forbidding use of contraceptives unconstitutionally 
intrudes upon the right of marital privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942) (holding that procreation was a fundamental right and invalidating a sterilization 
statute). 
 103  The Free Speech Clause reaches beyond the right to speak but it also protects a range of 
human expression and communication. In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring), Justice Brandeis found that free speech broadly protected those 
pursuits and activities that inform individual expression and thought:  
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make 
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces 
should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. 
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of 
liberty. The belief that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free 
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against, the dissemination of noxious doctrine . . . . 
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew . 
. . that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds 
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the 
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and 
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.  
Id. According to Brandeis, the Framers intended the First Amendment to make citizens free 
from government regulation that would suppress: (1) the development of the faculties of the 
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doctrine of Free Speech is a prime example. Free Speech protects verbal 
communication from government censorship, and protects the written word from 
government screening before publication. However, it does more than protect the 
written and spoken word it also protects political expressions, such as a protester 
shouting through a megaphone on a soapbox, or activists passing out pamphlets in 
the town square. In sum, the Free Speech Clause, includes a “bundle of sticks,” or 
rights, that are integral to the exercise of political expression, but which might not be 
expressly listed in the text of the Clause.104  
In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court reversed a civil contempt order against the 
Alabama chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People for refusing to produce the names and addresses of its rank-and-file 
members.105 The Court found the disclosure of such a list rendered its members 
vulnerable to social and economic reprisal and thus restricted its members’ freedom 
of association.106 The Court stated that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and 
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by 
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon 
the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”107  
Like the freedom of association, the discovery and spread of truth is another 
interest protected under the First Amendment. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
wrote in Abrams v. United States: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas -- that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.108  
The “discovery of truth” is even recognized as a First Amendment concern by 
scholars who adopt a narrow view of the Clause. 
For example, Judge Robert Bork concluded that the First Amendment does not 
cover scientific, educational, commercial, or literary expression because the First 
Amendment only protects “explicitly political speech.”109 But even under this narrow 
reading of the First Amendment, Judge Bork found that the “discovery and spread of 
political truth” merited judicial protection because it is an essential function of 
                                                           
individual; (2) the happiness to be derived from engaging in the activity; (3) the provision of a 
safety value for society; and, (4) the discovery and spread of political truth. Id. 
 104  See Anna di Robilant, A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 870-74 
(2013). The freedom of association, for instance, is not expressly mentioned in the First 
Amendment, but the Court has recognized it as an essential dimension of political activity. See 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). 
 105  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 288-91 (1964). 
 106  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
 107  Id. 
 108  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 109  Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles And Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1, 28 (1971).  
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political speech, which includes, “speech about how we are governed, and the 
category therefore includes a wide range of evaluation, criticism, electioneering and 
propaganda.”110  
Both narrow and expansive readings of the First Amendment can be reconciled 
with Bakke. Diversity facilitates the exchange of ideas on campuses. It creates 
opportunities for students to discover truth through interactions with their peers. In 
this way, students are trained in exercising their political rights under the First 
Amendment.111  
Admittedly, Bakke does not exactly mirror the academic freedom cases because 
the decision did not review laws designed to regulate the speech of teachers and 
faculty expressed in the classroom by basing employment in part on political 
viewpoint. Instead, Justice Powell’s holding, that campus diversity serves a 
compelling interest in admissions allowed colleges to determine who may be 
admitted to study on campus, protects the freedom of expression in pursuit of 
academic truth against policies designed to either gerrymander or suppress speech in 
the classroom.  
Campus diversity creates an atmosphere “which is most conducive to 
speculation, experiment and creation,” providing students with the means to discover 
“truth out of a multitude of tongues rather than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.”112 In this way, Justice Powell’s opinion “fits well into the existing First 
Amendment doctrinal universe by reinforcing the core right of ‘political speech’ 
through [the academic freedom doctrine, which advances] the First Amendment's 
primary goal of protecting robust debate so the people can make informed political 
and personal decisions.”113 Though Justice Powell might have extended the principle 
of academic freedom further than the context of its foundational cases, his opinion 
neither contradicts nor inhibits the doctrine’s goal of protecting the discovery of 
truth through a robust exchange of ideas in the classroom. In fact, it enhances the 
principle’s core concept—the discovery of truth—by making expression a part of the 
criteria in selecting students who are likely to contribute to truth-seeking 
exchanges.114  
b. The First Amendment and Racial Problems 
Though Bakke may not cause disruption in First Amendment jurisprudence, 
many believe its reasoning creates Equal Protection problems.115 Justice Powell’s 
holding—critics contend—make race-conscious programs into hybrid cases that 
present doctrinal tensions between concerns for academic freedom pulling on one 
                                                           
 110  Id.  
 111  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).  
 112  See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957); see also Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 113  James G. Wilson, Taking Stare Decisis Seriously: A Cautionary Tale for a Progressive 
Supreme Court, 10 J. JURIS. 327, 360 (2011). 
 114  Mae Kuykendall & Charles Adside, III, Unmuting the Volume: Fisher, Affirmative 
Action Jurisprudence, and the Racial Legacy of Silence, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 
1054-55 (2014). 
 115  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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end and guarantees against racial discrimination pulling on the other.116 Yet this 
tension between race and First Amendment principles is not a novel legal problem, 
as illustrated in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul117 and Virginia v. Black.118 
In R.A.V., the Court invalidated an ordinance that prohibited a person from 
knowingly using symbols that “arouse[d] anger, alarm, or resentment in others on 
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender . . . .” 119 Justice Scalia held that a 
law violates the First Amendment’s prohibition on content-based regulations when it 
forbids “fighting words,” a traditionally unprotected category of speech, while 
“impos[ing] special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored 
subjects.”120 In R.A.V., the ordinance prohibited public displays containing “odious 
racial epithets” but permitted placards that expressed fighting words “on the basis of 
political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality.”121 Justice Scalia 
concluded that legislation regulating “fighting words” could not be content-based, 
because the government would “license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while 
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”122 Although racial 
epithets maybe offensive, and even endanger interracial harmony, R.A.V. made it 
abundantly clear that government may not address the effects of hate speech by 
restricting expression.  
In Virginia v. Black, legislation designed to address the effects of hate speech 
again conflicted with the First Amendment.123 In Black, the Court struck down a 
provision in a statute that made cross-burning prima facie evidence of intent to 
intimidate, because the statute did not distinguish between conduct intended to 
intimidate from conduct intended to advance a political ideology.124 Though cross 
burning was historically a symbol of race-based violence, the Court held the First 
Amendment did not give states the flexibility to ban conduct that expresses an 
ideology that was intended to inflame “anger or resentment.”125  
R.A.V. and Black illustrate competing interests between legislation designed to 
combat socially disruptive effects of racial hate speech and the individual’s right to 
free expression. In both R.A.V. and Black, the Court sided with the individual’s right 
to free expression, although the Court had concerns that hate speech presented risks 
to social tranquility.126 Affirmative action jurisprudence, much like R.A.V. and Black, 
also places a higher constitutional premium on intellectual exchanges facilitated by 
                                                           
 116  Id.  
 117  505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 118  538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 119  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380. 
 120  Id. at 391. 
 121  Id.  
 122  Id. at 392. 
 123  Black, 538 U.S. at 347. 
 124  Id. at 364. 
 125  Id. at 366. 
 126  Id. at 362. 
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diversity programs than on the perceived benefits that could arise from prohibiting 
racial preferences in college admissions.  
c. Bakke and the Equal Protection Clause 
College administrators cannot, however, use racial categories carte blanche.127 
Fisher I clarified strict scrutiny rules for race-conscious college admission plans. It 
placed the burden on colleges to show that race-neutral alternatives cannot achieve 
their pedagogical goals and that race-conscious programming is necessary to achieve 
them.128 “[S]trict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate burden of 
demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications that available, workable race-
neutral alternatives do not suffice.”129 The standard does not afford colleges 
“deference” nor does it assume “good faith” on the part of administrators when they 
implement racial preferences.130 Abstract assertions are not enough: “Strict scrutiny 
does not permit a court to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions process uses 
race in a permissible way,” Justice Kennedy explained, “without a court giving close 
analysis to the evidence of how the process works in practice.”131 Thus, reviewing 
courts must examine whether an admissions program achieves the educational 
benefits that flow from diversity.132 
This is not to say that Justice Powell read the Equal Protection doctrine 
pristinely. Justice Powell consulted case law outside the doctrine to identify a 
compelling interest in campus diversity. The decision, though, has not produced 
confusion or logical errors in subsequent decisions. There is little misperception 
among institutional stakeholders about what Bakke demands. Justice Powell clearly 
stated that colleges must prove race-based programs are necessary to achieve 
educational goals.133 Bakke’s limited reach entrenches the decision further under 
stare decisis, removing the urgency for the Court to correct prevalent constitutional 
errors. 
Any perceived legal defects in Bakke are limited to the collegiate context. The 
Court has refused to export Bakke rules into other areas. For example, in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle, Chief Justice Roberts held that race-based 
school assignments for primary and secondary schools could not pass constitutional 
muster, even if the programs were modeled after Powell’s opinion, because Bakke 
recognized “a broad-based diversity” limited to the “unique context of higher 
education.”134 “[T]he expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the 
university environment,” he wrote, “[made] universities occupy a special niche in 
our constitutional tradition.”135 Narrowing Bakke to its facts serves prudential goals 
                                                           
 127  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978). 
 128  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420-22 (2013). 
 129  Id. at 2420. 
 130  Id. at 2419-20. 
 131  Id. at 2421. 
 132  Id.  
 133  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978). 
 134  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725 (2007). 
 135  Id. at 724. 
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by maintaining protection against racial discrimination under the strict scrutiny 
doctrine.  
2. Members of Academic Communities Are Protected Under Academic Freedom and 
Not Institutions.  
Professor Horwitz argued that the Court did not provide adequate guidance in 
how to apply the academic freedom doctrine, which is described in broad terms:  
There is no hint at this point that government ought to steer clear of other 
aspects of university life. Nor does the Court indicate that it would be 
concerned with restrictions on speech initiated by a public university 
itself, rather than the state. Moreover, although the passage embraces 
“[t]eachers and students” alike, it leaves unaddressed the questions of 
whether a university is entitled to restrict or to penalize speech by 
teachers, whether a university may restrict speech by students, and 
whether teachers in turn may restrict student speech.136 
But a fair reading of Sweezy and Keyishian shows that the right is not as vague as 
Professor Horwitz believes. Although Sweezy and Keyishian discuss the collective 
benefits the academic freedom doctrine provides to higher education and to the 
nation, the doctrine covered activities performed by individuals like “teachers,” 
“students,” or, more generally, “intellectual leaders.”137 Most notably, these rights 
are activated when they are exercised in the college setting.138  
Borrowing from Fourth Amendment terminology, academic freedoms are 
triggered when a person engages in certain activities that take place in a 
“constitutionally protected area.”139 So the liberty interest is heightened when a 
professor, teaching assistant, or a student engages in the myriad of intellectual 
activities, such as research, writing, or debate, which are related to their status as a 
member of that academic community.140 Accordingly, the academic freedom 
                                                           
 136  Horwitz, supra note 80, at 483.  
 137  Id.  
 138  The principle that fundamental rights are activated when exercised in constitutionally 
recognized areas is not novel. Take the Fourth Amendment as an example. While that 
amendment affords citizens autonomy from government intrusion into areas where they have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy, it does not establish a generalized right to privacy. That 
amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. The text suggests that privacy rights are contextual, that is, the amendment 
is “designed in part to protect privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain 
activities.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). An 
individual right to academic freedom operates much in the same manner as privacy does. Just 
as a citizen’s home is a “constitutionally protected area” under the Fourth Amendment, see 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001), the college and university campus is a 
protected space under the First Amendment where an array of academic activities are 
protected from government intrusion. 
 139  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.  
 140  Even if academic freedom is construed as an institutional right, such an interpretation 
presents little constitutional difficulties. Institutional rights are recognized in other areas of 
First Amendment jurisprudence as shown in recent Court decisions in Citizens United v. FEC, 
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doctrine applies generally to any person who is a member of the academic 
community rather than to the academic institution itself.  
3. Academic Freedom is Broad Enough to Incorporate Admission Programs 
As explained previously, some contend that academic freedom does not reach the 
circumstances presented in Bakke.141 Sweezy and Keyishian arose from direct 
government regulation of political speech in the classroom and thus such laws 
constitute paradigm infringements of that right.142 However, the Court did not limit 
the academic freedom doctrine only to the facts in Sweezy and Keyishian. Justice 
Frankfurter found that academic freedom meant more than being free from 
government suppression of political viewpoints.143 Instead, it broadly protects other 
related liberties, such as the right of a college to select “whom may be admitted to 
study.”144 His opinion implicitly recognized that admission programs serve a crucial 
role in a college’s effort to maintain an environment where students may engage in 
the discovery of truth.145  
Keyishian provides the reasoning, which ties Sweezy’s concern for truth and 
Bakke’s diversity rationale together in the free speech doctrine. Keyishian reasoned 
that the discovery of truth is facilitated through the robust exchange of ideas, which 
is a unique feature of a diverse college environment.146 Recognizing student body 
                                                           
558 U.S. 310 (2010), and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). Citizens United 
held that government could not limit independent expenditures spent by corporations for 
electioneering purposes based in part on the recognition that individuals use the corporate 
form to engage in political speech to contribute to the “discussion, debate, and dissemination 
of information of ideas.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343. The Court again recognized the 
existence of institutional based rights in Hobby Lobby. There, the Court explained that even 
when the Court extends constitutional or statutory rights to institutions, such as corporations, 
it does so for the individual’s benefit:  
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve 
desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the 
people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a 
corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, 
are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people. 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2768. Admittedly, Citizens United and Hobby Lobby do not 
involve race-conscious admission programs. That being said, both decisions are instructive in 
highlighting the point that rights are not reserved for individuals only but are also conferred 
upon institutions as well. So assuming Justice Powell described the freedom as a right 
exercised by colleges, the description of that right is consistent with Citizens United and 
Hobby Lobby in principle. Thus, the criticism that academic freedom does not clearly identify 
its stakeholder is harmless. 
 141  See supra Part I.B. 
 142  Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. 
of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967) 
 143  Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 144  Id. 
 145  Id.  
 146  Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602. 
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diversity as an interest enables colleges to compose learning communities with 
students of diverse backgrounds in order to provide robust exchanges and thus 
facilitate the discovery of truth. Accordingly, a broad reading of Keyishian and 
Sweezy provides the foundational principles to argue that academic freedom doctrine 
is broad enough to encompass college admission’s programs given that academic 
freedom and diversity are integral principles in affirmative action law. 
II. BAKKE, STARE DECISIS, AND RACIAL DIVERSITY AS AN EMBEDDED PRINCIPLE IN 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE. 
Despite the fact that academic freedom and diversity are integral principles in 
affirmative action law, Bakke is still the target of criticism by race ideologues. Part II 
will show that these criticisms carry no jurisprudential weight, because the decision 
is immune from reversal under the doctrine of stare decisis. But the Court does not 
always follow precedent blindly and has developed criteria to guide it when it 
formally reconsiders a prior decision.  
A. Stare Decisis Criteria: Revisiting Bakke  
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the joint opinion 
explained the criteria the Court employs to identify circumstances that justify 
reversal.147 When revisiting precedent, the Court will consider if: (1) the decision has 
engendered widespread reliance among its stakeholders, (2) the rule is unworkable; 
(3) the Court abandoned or eroded the doctrine in the decision in later cases, and (4) 
the facts that justified the rule in the decision no longer exist to justify continued 
application of the rule.148  
The last two factors are not in serious contention. First, as it relates to the third 
factor, Justice Powell’s opinion is in no way a relic of an abandoned doctrine. Every 
affirmative action case since Bakke has followed Justice Powell’s opinion to resolve 
Equal Protection questions relating to admission programs.149 Bakke stands as the 
fulcrum in affirmative action jurisprudence, because the rules announced by Justice 
Powell serves as the touchstone of constitutional analysis in the area.150 Second, as it 
relates to the fourth factor, circumstances have not changed to render the decision 
irrelevant to modern admission plans. Colleges follow Bakke in how they craft race-
conscious programs.  
                                                           
 147  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867-68 (1992). 
 148  Id.  
 149  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (“Among the Court’s 
cases involving racial classifications in education, there are three decisions that directly 
address the question of considering racial minority status as a positive or favorable factor in a 
university’s admissions process, with the goal of achieving the educational benefits of a more 
diverse student body: [Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter].”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 
(2003) (“[W]e endorse Justice Powell’s view [in Bakke] that student body diversity is a 
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”); Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003) (“Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke emphasized the 
importance of considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing all of the 
qualities that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual's ability to contribute 
to the unique setting of higher education.”). 
 150  Id. 
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Therefore, the primary focus of this Part will be on the reliance and workability 
factors. This Part will show that colleges rely upon Bakke in how they organize their 
campuses each year, as reflected in diversity mission statements, recruitment efforts, 
and in hiring practices. Moreover, Bakke provides adequate guidance to reviewing 
courts and administrators by providing workable rules and models that identify those 
policies that would comport with and violate the Constitution.  
1. Reliance: Bakke and the Diversity Bureaucracy. 
Calculating reliance is crucial in stare decisis analysis.151 When considering 
reliance interests, the Court considers the respective costs incurred by those persons 
and institutions whose “settled expectations” would be uprooted if the Court 
overturned precedent.152 In prior cases, reliance interests weighed heavily in the 
Court’s decision to reaffirm precedents that received scathing criticism for perceived 
departures from the Constitution’s original meaning or from historical practice.153 
Reliance interest weighs strongly in favor of upholding Bakke on stare decisis 
principles because diversity is now the organizing principle at the nation’s colleges 
and universities. 
The costs incurred and the investments made by institutions of higher learning to 
achieve student body diversity are substantial.154 An extensive review of mission 
                                                           
 151  Casey, 505 U.S. at 855-856. 
 152  Kozel, supra note 19, at 446.  
 153  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), are 
two landmark decisions that sparked intense criticism over the reasoning the Court used to 
identify individual rights. These cases were reaffirmed in subsequent decisions on the basis 
that the decisions engendered widespread social reliance among citizens. In Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000), Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the claim that 
Miranda warnings were not constitutionally required under the Fifth Amendment, finding that 
Miranda established widespread expectations among the public: “Miranda has become 
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our 
national culture.” Likewise Casey reaffirmed Roe’s essential holding based upon reliance 
reasoning; it found that women had become reliant on the availability of abortion:  
For two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized 
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their 
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that 
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic 
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their 
reproductive lives.  
Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.  
 154  The Deans of Harvard and Yale Law Schools submitted a joint amicus brief in Fisher 
II. Like this Article, they argue that race-conscious admissions programs should be reaffirmed 
on stare decisis grounds. They explain how their institutions spent a considerable amount of 
resources to craft policies that follow the principles announced in Bakke:  
Harvard and Yale Law Schools have relied on [Bakke] in fashioning resource- and 
time-intensive processes designed both to identify students who possess the potential 
to become future leaders and to enrich their own institutional educational 
environments. Implementing these policies has required dozens of admissions officers 
and faculty reviewers, multiple rounds of evaluations, and significant expenditures of 
time and money. In undertaking such review processes, Harvard and Yale Law 
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statements posted on the websites of both public and private colleges and 
universities reveal that diversity, with an emphasis on race inclusion, is an integral 
part of their educational missions.155  
a. Diversity Mission Statements 
College administrators and faculty members believe that “student body diversity 
promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an increasingly 
diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.’”156 Brown 
University, a leading Ivy League institution, states that “[d]iversity is at the 
foundation of [our] academic enterprise.”157 Similarly, Louisiana State University 
makes clear that “[d]iversity is fundamental to [its] mission.”158  
College mission statements also announce the means or principles that will be 
pursued to achieve diversity. For example, Louisiana State University administrators 
and faculty found that in order to achieve diversity “it must make ‘[c]ultural 
inclusion [the] highest priority.”’159 Princeton University’s statement adopted the 
rationale for diversity, which Bakke and Grutter employed to justify racial 
preferences, explaining that diversity creates an environment that produces 
educational benefits: “[a] diverse environment is more intellectually and socially 
stimulating. The variety of viewpoints creates more debate and encourages people to 
                                                           
Schools have determined they cannot isolate race and exclude it from the otherwise 
comprehensive, individualized assessments necessary to fulfill their educational 
missions.  
Brief of Dean Robert Post and Dean Martha Minow as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 26, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015) (No. 11-345), 2015 WL 
6735850. 
 155  I want to express my gratitude to Richard A. Plowden for his contribution to Appendix 
A. He spent long hours coding college websites for diversity language, which was essential to 
creating this Appendix. Richard’s efforts substantiated the claims made in this section. 
Appendix A provides mission statements posted on the websites of twenty-seven colleges and 
universities from the Ivy Leagues, the Southeastern Conference, and the Big Ten. The 
Appendix presents statements, from both undergraduate and graduate programs that announce 
the individual school’s commitment to campus diversity with many programs declaring its 
goal to admit underrepresented minorities. Because these statements are taken from many of 
the nation’s leading universities, they are representative of competitive college programs 
across the country. A cursory review of these statements reveals some of the following themes 
or language that are commonly used by these institutions to articulate their missions. These 
statements refer to “diversity,” “race,” “ethnicity,” “inclusion,” “perspectives,” and 
“viewpoints.”  
 156  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (quoting amicus briefs). 
 157  Exploring Diversity at Brown, BROWN U., http://www.brown.edu/academics/college/ 
orientation/exploring-diversity-brown (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 158  Diversity Statement, LSU OFF. DIVERSITY, http://uiswcmsweb.prod.lsu.edu/edco/edco/ 
DiversityStatement/item25970.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 159  Id.  
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re-examine their own positions [because] diversity decrease[s] negative stereotypes 
and biases, and create[s] awareness of inequalities and discrimination . . . .”160  
Graduate programs, like law colleges, medical schools, and engineering 
programs, also adopt diversity statements and, in the process, reinforce the 
institutional commitment to diversity.161 In line with the University of Georgia’s 
diversity policy, the graduate school, for instance, announced its commitment “to 
promote diversity by encouraging enrollment of students from historically 
underrepresented groups and qualified programs abroad.”162 The commitment to 
                                                           
 160  See Many Voices, One future, an Inclusive Princeton, PRINCETON U., 
http://inclusive.princeton.edu/about/why (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). Another example is the 
University of Minnesota, which in its strategic framework explained the school’s role in the 
Nation’s Free Speech traditions. The University of Minnesota identified diversity, in its 
strategic framework, designed to achieve academic excellence, as “a necessary condition for 
excellence,” which is “achievable only in an environment that fully supports engagement with 
diverse cultures and perspectives.” Vision Implementation Summary, U. MINN. EQUITY & 
DIVERSITY VISION FRAMEWORK (Nov. 2011), (emphasis added), https://diversity.umn.edu/ 
sites/default/files/U%20of%20MN%2C%20Equity%20and%20Diversity%20Vision%20Fram
ework.pdf. 
 161  The University of Missouri has a campus-wide mission statement, advancing what it 
refers to as “Mizzou Diversity.” In addition to this statement, the school’s other thirteen 
colleges and schools have also adopted mission statements. See About Diversity at Mizzou, 
MIZZOU DIVERSITY, http://diversity.missouri.edu/about/mission-vision.php (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016). For example, the law school expressed its commitment to diversity in the following 
way: 
The Law School’s approach to diversity and cultural awareness is twofold. First, we 
are committed to recruiting and retaining a diverse community (students, staff and 
faculty) because we believe that a diverse community enriches the professional and 
personal experiences of our students, faculty and staff. The law school is better when 
it is comprised of folks who have varied backgrounds and experiences. These 
differences are manifested in classrooms discussions and in interactions outside of the 
classroom. In addition to creating a diverse community, we also offer course work that 
highlight diverse perspectives and thereby enhances students’ understanding of cross-
cultural perspectives. The Law School also offers clinic and externship opportunities 
to students that require that they interact with clients who often times come from 
cultural backgrounds that are very dissimilar to their own.  
University of Missouri Statements on Diversity Enhancement, U. MO., 
http://facultycouncil.missouri.edu/issues/diversity-statements/index.html#law (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016). Another example of a graduate program, which identifies racial diversity as an 
organizing principle is the Ohio State University Medical School: “Students underrepresented 
in medicine and biomedical sciences are more likely to serve minority and lower 
socioeconomic communities after completion of medical training; thereby improving the 
health care access and diminishing health care disparities.” Our Diversity Vision, OHIO ST. U. 
C. MED., http://medicine.osu.edu/students/diversity/ourdiversityvision/pages/index.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 162  University of Georgia Graduate Program Diversity Statement:  
The Graduate School aims to promote excellence in graduate education by recruiting 
top students to the University of Georgia. While striving to increase overall 
enrollment, the Graduate School also seeks to promote diversity by encouraging 
enrollment of students from historically underrepresented groups and qualified 
programs abroad. The Graduate School’s definition of underrepresented includes 
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diversity at the nation’s leading colleges is not limited to rhetoric announced in 
mission statements. Undergraduate and graduate programs employ measures to 
calibrate their respective institutions to achieve the type of diversity they intend to 
attain.  This is particularly true with respect to racial diversity.  
Race remains an important factor in the composition of student bodies. 
According to the National Association of College Admission Counseling, forty-five 
percent of the 446 four-year colleges that responded to surveys stated that race and 
ethnicity played either a “considerable,” “moderate,” or “limited” role in admission 
decisions.163 This is not to say that race plays a decisive role in admission decisions. 
While race remains an important factor in the admission process, it is only a single 
factor.164 It appears that colleges are careful to craft programs that are atheistically 
compliant with Bakke.  
But colleges have now extended their commitment to ethnic diversity beyond the 
admissions process. As a high-ranking administrator at Vanderbilt University stated, 
“[w]e recognize that top students can be found among all racial, ethnic, and 
socioeconomic groups, and our recruiters work hard to identify them and to make 
them aware of the opportunities available to Vanderbilt students.”165 To this end, 
colleges employ, in the words of Cornell University, “novel approaches [to] improve 
campus culture and . . . demographic composition.”166 Colleges no longer hope for 
diverse applicant pools. They now search for candidates that will enhance student 
body diversity. 
b. Student Recruitment and Retention Programs 
In addition to admission plans, colleges employ innovative recruitment efforts 
that collaborate with primary and secondary schools in predominately minority 
                                                           
race/ethnicity, gender within discipline, first generation, non-traditional age and/or a 
self-identified aspect of a uniquely diverse background.  
Recruitment & Diversity Initiatives, GRADUATE SCH.: U. GA, 
http://grad.uga.edu/index.php/current-students/recruitment-diversity/ (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016). 
 163  STATE OF COLLEGE ADMISSION, NAT’L ASS’N. FOR COLLEGE ADMISSION COUNSELING 
27 (2013), http://www.lkeducationalconsulting.com/images/soca2013.pdf. 
 164  In the same survey, the Association collected data from 1993 to 2012 and found that 
colleges listed an array of race-neutral factors, which they attribute “considerable importance” 
to when they evaluate applicants. Id. Colleges consider, for example, the strength of a 
teacher’s recommendation, a student’s participation in extracurricular activities, their class 
rank, and the grades they earned in college preparatory courses. Id.  
 165  Douglas Christiansen, Vice Provost for University Enrollment Affairs and Dean of 
Admissions and Financial Aid, said, “[w]e recognize that top students can be found among all 
racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups, and our recruiters work hard to identify them and to 
make them aware of the opportunities available to Vanderbilt students.” Undergraduate 
Admissions, VAND. U., http://admissions.vanderbilt.edu/life/diversity.php (last visited Mar. 5, 
2016). 
 166  Diversity & Inclusion: Commitment to Inclusion, CORNELL U., 
http://diversity.cornell.edu/commitment-to-inclusion (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) (“Cornell's 
approach to institutional inclusion and diversity planning is holistic. Our commitments, both 
regulatory and strategic, involve novel approaches to improve campus culture and our 
demographic composition.”). 
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communities to “publicize and discuss opportunities at their universities; developing 
minority-specific advertising and public relations materials; sponsoring fairs and 
open houses specifically for minority students.”167 These efforts give these 
institutions notoriety but also physical presence in majority-minority communities. 
The strategy is to encourage underrepresented minority students to apply to 
predominantly white universities.168 Colleges, particularly the most prestigious 
institutions, launch outreach and recruitment efforts across the nation.169 
The admissions office at Harvard University sponsors an Undergraduate 
Minority Recruitment Program, which is staffed by current college students who 
field questions from potential applicants about their college experience.170 The 
program organizes “on-campus and overnight visits, in addition to special 
information sessions and tours.”171 The stated goal for the program is “to help 
expand the diversity of incoming classes by encouraging minority students to 
consider applying to Harvard College.”172  
Some institutions believe that they can diversify campus demographics by 
assisting high school students preparing for standardized testing. As part of its 
mission to “integrate individuals from varied backgrounds and characteristics,” the 
University of Arkansas offers a Summer ACT Academy for eligible students to 
equip them with test-taking skills for five days as they stay in residence halls and 
                                                           
 167  CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: LEGAL VICTORIES, 
CONTINUING ATTACKS, AND NEW RESEARCH, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 27 (2007), 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-access/affirmative-action/charting-the-
future-of-college-affirmative-action-legal-victories-continuing-attacks-and-new-research. 
 168  Id. at 28. 
 169  See Welcome to Educational Equity: Fostering Diversity and Inclusion at Penn State, 
PENN ST. EDUC. EQUITY, http://equity.psu.edu/about (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) (“Created in 
July 1990, the Office of the Vice Provost for Educational Equity is charged with fostering 
diversity and inclusion at Penn State and creating a climate of diversity, equity, and inclusion 
throughout the University’s faculty, staff, leadership, and student body. This mission 
encompasses leadership for the University-wide strategic planning for diversity and inclusion, 
student academic success services and Federal TRIO Programs for underrepresented students, 
and support of educational access for targeted groups of low-income, potential first-generation 
college students both here at Penn State and at sites throughout the state, and serving as a 
catalyst and advocate for Penn State’s diversity and inclusion initiatives by providing 
University-wide leadership to increase our capacity for diversity . . . . Beyond the University, 
in targeted high schools and counties, the office helps low-income youth and adults to 
overcome the social, cultural, and educational barriers to success in higher education.”). 
 170  Find Rich Cultural Communities and Opportunities, HARV. C. ADMISSIONS & FIN. AID, 
https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/hear-our-students/multicultural-diversity (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2016). 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. Similar to the recruitment program at Harvard, the undergraduate admissions office 
at Columbia University has organized a Multicultural Recruitment Committee, which is a 
group of six college students who assist the office in identifying and recruiting applicants 
from historically underrepresented backgrounds to create “a vibrant and dynamic first-year 
class.” Multicultural Recruitment Committee, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS, 
https://undergrad.admissions.columbia.edu/learn/studentlife/diversity/mrc (last visited Mar. 5, 
2016). 
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become acquainted with the opportunities the school has to offer them.173 Carnegie-
Mellon University, as another example, provides a rigorous six-week summer 
academy for high school students considering careers in math, science, or 
engineering to build their “academic and personal skills” in preparing them for 
admission into selective colleges.174  
Other institutions take its recruitment effort to the next level by establishing a 
physical presence in targeted communities. The University of Michigan, for instance, 
established the Detroit Center to serve “as a gateway for University and urban 
communities to take advantage of each other’s learning, research and cultural 
activities,” such as symposiums, musicals, and film series.175 The University of 
Michigan’s Detroit Center is on the vanguard of university programs aimed at 
recruiting future minority students. The Center has forged partnerships with local K-
12 schools, providing lectures and workshops aimed at coaching students in the 
metropolitan area in preparation for college.176 Another one-of-a-kind program is the 
Medical Experience Academy, organized by the Medical School at the University of 
South Carolina, which builds education “pipeline partnerships” with colleges and 
universities that “encourage healthcare careers among diverse, underrepresented, 
underserved, and socioeconomically challenged populations.”177 The Academy also 
exposes aspiring medical students to “health care through simulations, lectures, 
workshops, research and community service.”178 
Even after enrollment, many elite universities administer programs designed to 
increase retention and graduation rates among their minority students. Yale 
University, for example, has a Cultural Connections program, which is “designed to 
introduce freshmen to Yale’s cultural resources as well as to explore the diversity of 
student experiences on the Yale campus, with emphasis on the experiences of 
traditionally underrepresented students and issues related to racial identity.”179 The 
program is a mini-mentoring program where sophomores and juniors act as either a 
big brother or sister to incoming minority freshman during their five-day stay on 
campus.180  
Universities have also institutionalized their retention plans in the form of special 
advising offices that are usually placed under the auspice of their multicultural 
office. For instance, the Office of Pluralism and Leadership at Dartmouth College 
                                                           
 173  Arkansas High School Students Attending ACT Academy, U. ARK. (June 25, 2015), 
http://news.uark.edu/articles/27776/arkansas-high-school-students-attending-act-academy. 
 174  SAMS: Summer Academy for Math + Science, CARNEGIE MELLON UNDERGRADUATE 
ADMISSION, http://admission.enrollment.cmu.edu/pages/diversity-sams (last visited Mar. 5, 
2016). 
 175  Detroit Center, U. MICH., http://detroitcenter.umich.edu/about (last visited Mar. 5, 
2016). 
 176  Id.  
 177  Clinical University: Pipeline Partners, GREENVILLE HEALTH SYS., 
http://university.ghs.org/medex/partners/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
 178  Id.  
 179  Cultural Connections, YALE C., http://culturalconnections.yalecollege.yale.edu/ (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2016).  
 180  Id.  
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provide “sociocultural advising” through a series of programs designed to help 
minority students cope with a variety of issues that may hinder their academic 
success.181 These issues may pertain to social adjustment, financial aid, and even bias 
incidents on campus.182 In addition to this programming, undergraduate and graduate 
programs provide so-called “bridge programs” to incoming students, particularly to 
those students from underrepresented backgrounds, so they can “find peer support, 
academic rigor and professional networking that equip them with the skills and 
relationships for academic success as well as professional success.”183 Bridge 
programs aim to increase success rates among minority students by making them 
aware of the resources available to them.184 These practices demonstrate a strong 
                                                           
 181  Office of Pluralism and Leadership, DARTMOUTH DIRECT, 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dartmouthdirect/2013/12/guest-post-welcome-from-opal/ (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016) (OPAL advances Dartmouth’s commitment to academic success, 
diversity, inclusion, and wellness by engaging all students in development of identity, 
community, and leadership. OPAL provides academic and sociocultural advising, designs and 
facilitates educational programs, and serves as advocates for all students and communities. 
OPAL is for all students who want to get the most from their unique Dartmouth experience). 
 182  Welcome to OPAL, DARTMOUTH DIRECT, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~opal/ (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016) (OPAL provides advising programs that target specific minority groups; these 
programs include the Black Student Advising, Latina/o Student Advising, Native American 
Program, and Pan Asian Student Advising.). 
 183  Diversity in Engineering Center: Minority Engineering Program, U. DAYTON, 
https://www.udayton.edu/engineering/diversity/minority_engineering.php (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016). Recognizing that minority students are underrepresented in physics programs, many 
universities partner with the APS Physics Bridge Program “to increase the number of physics PhDs 
awarded to underrepresented minority (URM) students, including African American, Hispanic 
American, and Native American students.” APS Physics Bridge Program: Project Summary, APS 
PHYSICS BRIDGE PROGRAM, http://www.apsbridgeprogram.org/resources/ project-summary.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016). To this end, APS financially sponsors programs at so-called bridge sites that 
“will host students (APS Bridge Fellows) who typically would not gain acceptance into a physics 
doctoral program, to spend a period of 1-2 years after their undergraduate studies enhancing their 
academic and research skills before applying to a doctoral program.” Id. Bridge sites are operated at 
the following universities: California State University Long Beach, Florida State University, Ohio 
State University, and the University of South Florida. See APS Physics Bridge Programs: Bridge 
Sites, APS PHYSICS BRIDGE PROGRAM, http://www.apsbridgeprogram.org/institutions/bridge (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016). Similarly, the University of Dayton strives to increase the presence of 
minorities in highly technical fields, such as engineering. The School of Engineering at the 
university provides the Minority Engineering Program where: “African American, Hispanic 
American and Native American students find peer support, academic rigor and professional 
networking that equip them with the skills and relationships for academic success as well as 
professional success as future engineers.” Diversity in Engineering Center: Minority Engineering 
Program, U. DAYTON, https://www.udayton.edu/engineering/diversity/minority_engineering.php 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016) 
 184  Pathways Programs: Gateway to Graduate School Bridge Program, GRADUATE SCH., 
U. GA., http://grad.uga.edu/index.php/current-students/recruitment-diversity/programs-
workshops/summer-bridge-program (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
The Summer Bridge program allows new incoming graduate students from 
historically underrepresented backgrounds to begin their graduate education at UGA 
in the summer semester rather than the fall. The Graduate School defines 
underrepresented as those who self-identify with an ethnic/racial group, income 
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commitment by colleges and universities to both create and retain diverse student 
bodies. But a diverse student body is not enough if a diverse faculty does not teach 
it.  
c. Diversity-Oriented Hiring Practices 
Colleges are not only concerned with acclimating racial minorities to a collegiate 
environment, but they also employ strategies to recruit potential faculty members 
that will mirror the diversity of their student bodies. The diversity principle 
motivates universities to assemble diverse faculties and to develop teaching methods 
that maximize opportunities for exchange between students in the classroom. To this 
end, colleges and universities have established offices focused in part on recruiting 
racial minorities through faculty diversity plans.185 These institutions have concluded 
that special efforts are required to attract minority academics because minority 
professors continue to be underrepresented on their faculties.186 There is a sense 
among administrators that minority faculty members face unique challenges, and that 
such experiences positively contribute to scholarship in a variety of disciplines.187  
Skeptics claim that administrators aim to achieve the right racial balance or mix 
in their faculties in order to promote the image of an elite institution.188 Many 
universities, however, do more than pay attention to the racial mix of their 
                                                           
background or gender in a particular discipline that has not been traditionally 
represented in higher education. Underrepresented also includes first generation and 
non-traditional age college students. To participate, students must be admitted to the 
University of Georgia, receive funding from their department or other campus entity, 
and be nominated for this program by the graduate coordinator for their department. 
Id. 
 185  As an example, the Office of Inclusion and Diversity in the Medical School at the 
University of Penn developed a detailed plan for faculty diversity. See Faculty Diversity, U. 
PENN., http://www.med.upenn.edu/inclusion-and-diversity/faculty.html (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016). 
 186  See Office of the Senior Vice Provost: Faculty Development & Diversity, HARV. U., 
http://www.faculty.harvard.edu/diversity (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (“Harvard University is 
committed to pursuing the benefits of diversity among its faculty because these brilliant 
scholars are absolutely essential in keeping the institution become productive, creative, 
competitive, and successful in its mission to train the next generation of leaders in all fields of 
endeavor.”).  
 187  Id. (“There continues to be underrepresentation of U.S. ethnic and racial minorities in 
[the Harvard faculty], including African Americans, Hispanic/Latinos, Native Americans and 
in certain disciplines, Asian/Asian Americans. The needs of our U.S. ethnic and racial 
minority groups must be understood in more nuanced contexts, taking into account the 
diversity of experiences and histories that different sub-groups within these categories have 
faced for generations. More importantly, we need to ensure that we carefully consider how 
minority faculty have experienced the academy, and the unique challenges they have faced.”). 
 188  Colorblind purists can argue that race-conscious admission plans and hiring practices 
are intended to produce the desired “racial aesthetic” on both sides of the teaching lectern. See 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The concern that 
government employers may advance race-based agendas or promote identity politics through 
hiring practices has been raised in the Court’s race jurisprudence. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557, 596 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).  
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faculties.189 They also focus on the caliber of their instructors as well as the quality 
of teaching in the classroom. Colleges implement extensive plans to integrate 
diversity principles into the pedagogical methods of their instructors that attempt to 
materialize the claimed educational benefits that arise from classroom diversity.  
The University of Michigan, for example, trains and encourages its instructors to 
use “inclusive teaching strategies” through a center organized to research and 
identify the best teaching practices for classroom instruction.190 These techniques are 
aimed to facilitate the open exchange of ideas that are at the heart of the University’s 
mission. The Center for Research on Learning and Teaching at the University of 
Michigan explained, “[i]nclusive classrooms are classrooms in which instructors and 
students work together, to create and sustain an environment in which everyone feels 
safe, supported, and encouraged to express her or his views and concerns.”191 To 
achieve this goal, instructors are encouraged to incorporate multiple perspectives in 
their course curriculum in a way that does not “trivialize or marginalize” the 
perspectives or experiences of their minority students.192 More generally, instructors 
are told to employ techniques that insulate their teaching style from personal 
biases.193  
The Center claims these biases create an atmosphere where troublesome 
“assumptions” burden student-teacher interaction, such as believing minority 
students are experts on their race or that white students are neither interested in race 
nor can provide any insight on the subject.194 Free exchange between students is thus 
inhibited. As this section shows, Bakke helped to lay the foundation that encouraged 
academics to develop an entire body of research designed to inform instructors on 
how to manifest the benefits that flow from campus diversity in the classroom. 
Bakke’s impact on higher education cannot be understated. 
Today, an intricate system of policies, initiatives, programs, partnerships, offices, 
and hiring practices has grown around Bakke. Diversity, in which race plays an 
important role, serves as an organizing principle that guides how universities create 
their learning communities, construct their identities, and achieve their educational 
goals. Bakke has led to the creation of the modern “diversity bureaucracy” at college 
                                                           
 189  In affirmative action jurisprudence, college administrators do not violate the 
Constitution if they pay “some attention” to admission demographics to be aware of the racial 
makeup of its incoming classes when they make admission decisions. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 
336; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323-34 (1978). However, 
attention to racial demographics can “become unlawful when race is mechanically employed 
to achieve racial goals in a process devoid of any meaningful individualized assessment.” 
Kuykendall & Adside, supra note 114, at 1085; see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 284 
(2003).  
 190  Center on Research on Learning and Teaching: Inclusive Teaching Strategies, U. 
MICH., http://www.crlt.umich.edu/multicultural-teaching/inclusive-teaching-strategies (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 191  Center on Research on Learning and Teaching: Creating Inclusive College 
Classrooms, U. MICH., http://www.crlt.umich.edu/gsis/p3_1 (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 192  Id.  
 193  Id.  
 194  Id.  
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campuses.195 The diversity bureaucrat, or administrator, is concerned with the 
cultural climate on campus and aims to build community among minority students 
and integrate them into the larger social fabric. But the creation and maintenance of 
campus diversity is not only the concern of diversity officials. The student body is 
invested in the enterprise as well. There is now a diversity culture on college 
campuses where students voluntarily organize events around cultural or racial 
identities that foster community and belonging among minority students.  
While diversity officials facilitate some of these functions, many activities are 
products of grassroots efforts organized by student groups.196 Race-based student 
groups, fraternities, and sororities sponsor an array of activities designed to provide a 
unique cultural experience to their members. These activities include: lectures, 
dinners, trips, film showings, dance workshops, and step show competitions.197  
The bureaucracy does not necessarily operate in a top-down or authoritarian 
fashion. It can operate bottom-up; students possess creative license to develop 
activities designed to establish intra-racial cohesion and interracial exchange.198 The 
                                                           
 195  Some commentators use the phrase “diversity bureaucracy” as a pejorative to criticize 
the resources spent on employees and administrators to operate multicultural offices; critics 
view these expenditures as wasteful. E.g., Heather MacDonald, End UC’s Diversity Charade, 
ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/diversity-505938-
faculty-university.html (deriding the University of California System’s investment in an 
“ever-growing diversity bureaucracy” headed by administrators who are paid six figure 
salaries.); George Will, Unintended Consequences of Racial Preferences, WASH. POST (Nov. 
30, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-unintended-consequences-of-racial 
preferences/2011/11/29/gIQAbuoPEO_story.html (accusing “diversity bureaucracies” of 
using minority students as “public utilities” to enrich the academic experiences of others). 
Notwithstanding the policy objections to diversity offices, I believe the “diversity 
bureaucracy” takes on a positive connotation in constitutional law. It is strong evidence of 
how diversity has become engrained in the admission process and culture at college campuses. 
 196  Connect, Experience, Lead: Explore & Discover Who You Want To Be, HILLEL: U. 
MICH., https://michiganhillel.org/experience/ (describing events, trips, and projects that are 
available to “all Jewish students and their friends.”); The William Monroe Trotter 
Multicultural House, U. MICH., http://trotter.umich.edu/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (listing the 
variety of activities sponsored by the house for Black History Month); National Pan-Hellenic 
Council, U. MICH., http://www.umich.edu/~nphc/history.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) 
(explaining the history and activities of historically black fraternities and sororities on 
campus). 
 197  See supra note 196 and accompanying text.  
 198  Yet the diversity bureaucracy and the culture it fosters can potentially be a totalitarian 
force on campuses, if it is not placed under close Equal Protection surveillance. Kuykendall & 
Adside, supra note 114, at 1073 (“Too much administrative control, even if done in good 
faith, clouds free university exchange.”). This can manifest if top-down admission programs 
pay close attention to the racial demographics of its incoming freshman classes without 
evaluating how each candidate can enrich the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 1076. In such an 
environment, students can easily isolate themselves into race-based student groups or housing 
arrangements where “racial groupthink” is policed by fellow peers. Id. at 1029. As a 
consequence, interracial exchange, problem solving, or exposure to differing viewpoints is 
limited to the artificial classroom setting. Id. at 1027 (“[A] classroom is a place that has the 
potential to be sterile or what has been called a non-place, meaning a ‘space which cannot be 
defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity.’”). This point will be explored 
in Part III.  
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diversity bureaucracy and the culture it fosters carries weight in affirmative action 
jurisprudence, because diversity programs serve as the specific means that 
universities employ to manifest educational benefits that flow from campus 
diversity.  
The direct educational benefits that flow from diversity are doctrinally important 
since Fisher I reaffirmed that strict scrutiny requires lower courts to search into 
whether these educational benefits manifest in practice, because “the mere recitation 
of a ‘benign’ or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or no 
weight.”199 To achieve these benefits, colleges have established bureaucratic systems 
that are staffed to oversee the implementation of “a comprehensive range of 
exemplary educational programs that foster and sustain an environment that 
promotes academic excellence, respects differences, and accepts inclusiveness.”200 
These bureaucracies factor heavily in stare decisis analysis because their existence 
shows widespread institutional reliance upon Bakke on the part of colleges and 
universities in the fulfillment of their respective missions.  
2. Workability: Bakke is no Lemon  
Bakke allowed experimentation with race in achieving educational benefits, but 
with clear guidelines to avoid impermissible usages of racial classifications. This 
section explains how Justice Powell’s rule is relatively straightforward for 
administrators to comprehend in crafting Bakke compliant policies. The rule has 
proven durable, providing clear guidelines for the judiciary to scrutinize diversity 
programs for Equal Protection violations.  
The doctrine of stare decisis recognizes that precedent must provide adequate 
guidance to stakeholders so they may organize their behavior to comply with legal 
regimes imposed upon them. To this end, precedent limits judicial discretion, 
providing parties with information to reasonably predict the trajectory of 
jurisprudence.201 “A persistent goal in constitutional law,” one scholar wrote, “is to 
yield predictable results, to increase society’s justified expectations . . . .”202 
                                                           
 199  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013).  
 200  Office of Diversity and Multicultural Affairs, AUBURN U., 
http://develop.auburn.edu/ways/units/diversity/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (“Diversity is a core 
value at Auburn University. The Office for Diversity and Multicultural Affairs strives to offer 
a comprehensive range of exemplary educational programs that foster and sustain an 
environment that promotes academic excellence, respects differences, and accepts 
inclusiveness.”). Texas A&M University, like Auburn, has established an office responsible 
for organizing diversity-oriented activities. The office of the Vice President and Associate 
Provost for Diversity, who heads a standing university-wide committee on diversity, leads the 
strategic coordination of university-wide diversity-related activities, consider processes for the 
collection of equity and climate data, diversity initiatives, as well as recruitment and retention 
strategies and outcomes. See Diversity Operations Committee, TEX. A&M U., 
http://diversity.tamu.edu/Diversity-Operations-Committee (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); see also 
Office for Institutional Diversity, U. KY., http://www.uky.edu/Diversity/about.html (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016) (“[Office for Institutional Diversity] staff provide consultation and 
assistance to the various colleges in developing diversity and inclusion strategies and metrics 
in their individual strategic plans.”).  
 201  Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459, 1475 (2013).  
 202  Josh Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the Pursuit of a 
Statute’s Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 351, 408 (2010). 
34https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss3/7
2016] REPLAY THAT TUNE 553 
 
Precedent that establishes unworkable rules, on the other hand, sparks years of 
litigation due in part to arbitrary lines drawn that produce inconsistent results from 
case to case.203 Such decisions often result in intense debate among the Justices and 
leave “[p]ersuasive criticism” in their wake.204 Take the Lemon test as an example, 
because it stands in contrast to Bakke.  
Lemon held, in relevant part, that government practices challenged under the 
Establishment Clause must have, (1) a secular purpose, and (2) the primary effect of 
neither advancing nor inhibiting religion to survive review.205 In Lynch v. Donnelly 
and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court attempted to provide additional 
standards to guide lower courts in applying the Lemon-test to identify Establishment 
Clause violations.206 Those decisions instructed courts to strike down any practices 
found to be “endorsements” of religion if the practices made non-adherents feel like 
political “outsiders” and adherents feel like “insiders” or “favored members of the 
political community.”207  
However, the Court conceded that “endorsement,” as a doctrinal principle, was 
not “self-defining.”208 Justice O’Connor explained that review in this area involved 
“case-specific examinations” that required judges to consider the “unique 
circumstances” of each matter.209 Judges employ a hypothetical, “reasonable 
observer” who takes into account the “text, legislative history, and implementation” 
of the practice to determine if it constitutes an endorsement of religion.210 Justice 
O’Connor’s attempt to provide clarity to Establishment Clause jurisprudence made 
the doctrinal waters murkier. The “reasonable observer” standard provoked more 
questions than answers. Some of these questions include: Would this reasonable 
                                                           
 203  See Vieth v. Jubeiner, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (reversing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 
U.S. 109 (1986)—which held that plaintiffs could establish political gerrymandering claims if 
they showed intentional discrimination to target a political group—because the standard 
proved not to be unmanageable, inviting eighteen years of litigation in the lower courts); see 
also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 204  Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 205  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 206  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (O’Connor J., concurring)) (“In my concurrence in Lynch, I suggested a 
clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine to reinforce the concept that the 
Establishment Clause ‘prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in 
any way to a person's standing in the political community.’”). 
 207  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.  
 208  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593.  
 209  Id. at 623 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 210  See id. at 631 (“The question under endorsement analysis, in short, is whether a 
reasonable observer would view such longstanding practices as a disapproval of his or her 
particular religious choices, in light of the fact that they serve a secular purpose rather than a 
sectarian one and have largely lost their religious significance over time.”); see also McCreary 
v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 
(2000)) (“The eyes that look to purpose belong to an ‘objective observer,’ one who takes 
account of the traditional external signs that show up in the ‘text, legislative history, and 
implementation of the statute,’ or comparable official act.”). 
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observer be an “outsider” who is a member of the religious minority? Or, would this 
hypothetical person be an ordinary member of the majority faith? Perhaps, the 
“objective observer” would be a neutral arbiter who can discern the motives of those 
who enacted the challenged law.211  
In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy criticized the Establishment Clause doctrine as 
“flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.”212 Justice Thomas assailed 
Lemon as “incapable of consistent application.”213 Judicial inquiries into legislative 
intent or purpose present evidentiary difficulties, because deriving a single intent 
from a multi-member body can become an “impossible task.”214 As Chief Justice 
Warren warned, “[i]nquiries into [legislative] motives or purposes, are a hazardous 
matter.”215 The legislative histories the Court must consult to discern intent can be—
depending on the case—too voluminous, too scarce, or too manipulated to offer any 
meaningful insight.216 Justices have complained that such inquiries provide little or 
no clear guidance on what specific pieces of history should be afforded more weight 
over others.217  
Unlike subjective-based standards, which place decisions like Lemon under 
withering criticism, Bakke operates much more like a bright-line rule. Justice Powell 
made clear that race is only a single factor among other characteristics in evaluating 
each individual applicant for admission.218 Thus, colleges cannot employ admission 
                                                           
 211  See FRANK S. RAVITCH, LAW AND RELIGION, A READER: CASES, CONCEPT, AND THEORY 
274 (2d ed. 2008). 
 212  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 213  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 214  See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 215  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). 
 216  Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 637-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a thought-provoking dissent, 
Justice Scalia posited a litany of questions to illustrate the lack of guidance that arises from 
subjective standards that resort to legislative history to resolve legal questions:  
[W]here ought we to look for the individual legislator's purpose? We cannot of course 
assume that every member present (if, as is unlikely, we know who or even how many 
they were) agreed with the motivation expressed in a particular legislator's 
preenactment floor or committee statement . . . Can we assume, then, that they all 
agree with the motivation expressed in the staff-prepared committee reports they 
might have read - even though we are unwilling to assume that they agreed with the 
motivation expressed in the very statute that they voted for? Should we consider 
postenactment floor statements? Or postenactment testimony from legislators, 
obtained expressly for the lawsuit? Should we consider media reports on the realities 
of the legislative bargaining? All of these sources, of course, are eminently 
manipulable. Legislative histories can be contrived and sanitized, favorable media 
coverage orchestrated, and postenactment recollections conveniently distorted. 
Id.; see also McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005) (“[s]avvy officials [can] disguise[ 
] their religious intent so cleverly that the objective observer just misses it.”). 
 217  See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978); Blackman, supra note 202, at 407-09. 
 218  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17. 
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programs that make race the decisive factor in evaluating an applicant.219 Justice 
Powell’s “race—as-one-factor” rule gives courts an unambiguous mandate to follow 
as they examine those programs claiming to be compliant with Bakke, but in reality 
make race the dominant category. 
In Gratz, for example, the Court invalidated, 7-2, an undergraduate admissions 
program that allocated points to applicants based upon specified categories under a 
point system.220 Under that program, applicants received points towards admission 
based upon a number of categories, such as grade point average, standardized test 
scores, strength of personal essay, and so on. But the most relevant feature of the 
point system was that applicants, from underrepresented racial backgrounds, 
received twenty points or “one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission.”221 
The Court found that the automatic distribution of twenty points to minority 
applicants prevented the sort of individualized assessment needed to determine if a 
particular applicant could contribute to campus diversity.222 In doing so, the 
mechanical allocation of twenty points to an applicant solely on the basis of race 
made the factor decisive for “virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented 
minority applicant.”223  
The approach adopted in Gratz demonstrates that Bakke does not require 
reviewing courts to canvass through a voluminous amount of evidence to 
imaginatively reconstruct the intent of college administrators to uncover illegitimate 
motives.224 Gratz’s reasoning mirrors Bakke in some ways. In Bakke, Justice Powell 
pointed to the expressed terms of the admissions program at the medical school, 
which reserved sixteen out of one hundred seats for minority applicants, to conclude 
that the program violated the Equal Protection Clause.225 Both Bakke and Gratz 
reveal that, at a minimum, courts are able to conduct a facial review of an admissions 
program for racial classifications and then evaluate the text or structure of that 
program to determine whether race is the dominant category. Bakke’s treatment of 
                                                           
 219  Id. 
 220  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 221  Id. at 270. 
 222  Id. at 271-72. 
 223  Id. at 272. 
 224  Blackman, supra note 202, at 363-64: (“[One approach] to intentionalism is termed 
imaginative reconstruction. Under this approach, ‘[T]he interpreter tries to discover “what the 
law-maker meant by assuming his position, in the surroundings in which he acted, and 
endeavoring to gather from the mischiefs he had to meet and the remedy by which he sought 
to meet them, his intention with respect to the particular point in controversy.”’ In other 
words, imaginative reconstruction seeks to reincarnate the dead hand of the legislature that 
passed the bill and ask how it would have decided the case or controversy before the court. As 
in the case of specific intent theory, the imaginative reconstruction approach suffers from 
aggregation and attribution problems, namely, determinations regarding ‘whose intent the 
court should attempt to reconstruct.’ Is it even possible to identify the ‘pivotal’ voter? 
Professor Eskridge notes that ‘imaginative reconstruction may be more imaginative than 
reconstructive . . . .”). 
 225  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978). 
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the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny appears simple enough for courts to 
apply.226  
Strict scrutiny equips courts with tools to “‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race” 
in admission programs that may in practice “promote notions of racial inferiority and 
lead to a politics of racial hostility.”227 Fisher I reaffirmed basic precepts in the strict 
scrutiny canon. There, Justice Kennedy explained that the narrow tailoring prong of 
strict scrutiny instructs courts to verify that it is “‘necessary’ for a university to use 
race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.”228 To that end, courts can 
explore whether other race-neutral alternatives would produce the university’s 
interest.229 If such alternatives exist, “then the university may not consider race.”230 
In future cases, courts may also employ admissions data to filter out impermissible 
motives.231 Consulting such evidence as a lens into the motives of challenged 
programs would be in keeping with the principle that courts cannot take college 
administrators’ justifications for using race at face value.232  
III. WHY FOLLOWING BAKKE STRENGTHENS THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 
Bakke engendered reliance among stakeholders and provided workable principles 
to control affirmative action cases. Simply put, Bakke advances stare decisis 
principles. However, this Article touches upon a historically sensitive topic during a 
momentous time when the nation is now hotly debating the state of race relations in 
                                                           
 226  But courts have disagreed on how to apply Bakke in difficult cases. Compare Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d. 821, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (ruling that the Law School’s pursuit 
of a critical mass of underrepresented minorities was “indistinguishable from a straight quota 
system” and thus unconstitutional), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 747-48 (6th Cir. 
2002) (en banc) (holding that the Law School’s goal to attain a critical mass of 
underrepresented minorities was flexible and did not transform the program into a quota 
system). Take Grutter as an example. There, Justice O’Connor held that the law school’s 
mission to admit a “critical mass” of underrepresented minorities did not operate as a quota. 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-35. She found that Justice Powell did not disapprove of programs 
designed to achieve “minimum goals for minority enrollment.” Id. at 335 (emphasis added). 
Quotas, Justice O’Connor explained, are impermissible because they dictate “a fixed number 
or percentage which must be attained,” whereas goals are “flexible” and do not require a 
specified minimum or maximum number of minorities for admittance. Id. at 335-36. I have 
written elsewhere that while the distinction Justice O’Connor made between these terms 
maybe semantically correct (and that may even be debatable), the distinction may not carry 
any significance under strict scrutiny rules. Kuykendall & Adside, supra note 114, at 1062. In 
Bakke, the parties, like the opposing sides in Grutter, debated over whether the challenged 
admissions program should be characterized as a racial quota or a racial goal. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
at 288-89. Justice Powell concluded that the debate was over “semantic[s]” because 
“[w]hether [the] limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of 
race and ethnic status,” making the program presumptively unconstitutional. Id. at 289.  
 227  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
 228  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
 229  Id.  
 230  Id.  
 231  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 232  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.  
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the wake of racial anxiety.233 Racial incidents spark debate over the appropriate role 
government should assume in addressing continued racial problems; affirmative 
action is an issue where the question is debated. Colorblind purists not only argue 
that the Constitution prohibits race-conscious admission programs, but their 
opposition to such plans expands into a broader policy statement against color-
conscious activity.234 They argue that racial classifications present social dangers to 
our democracy and affirmative action jurisprudence should serve as a bulwark 
against it.235 This argument is worthy of response. This section shows how a purely 
colorblind approach hinders this nation’s ability to rise above racial problems. 
A. Colorblind Purity, Moral Outrage, and Closing the Door on the  
Democratic Process. 
Apart from the debate among Justices and legal scholars over affirmative action 
jurisprudence, there is an organized movement to persuade voters and legislators to 
illegalize race-conscious activity within the states. This section explains how 
statewide bans on race-conscious activity short-circuits the political process. 
However, it is recognized that moral outrage at color-conscious government activity 
is not totally without merit. Indeed, American history teaches us to be highly 
suspicious of the motives of government officials when they treat citizens differently 
on the basis of race.236  
Both federal and state governments have used race to establish a social order 
designed to subjugate racial minorities. A white propertied aristocracy in the South 
invested its fortunes to protect its interest in slavery; in the Jim Crow era, it 
regenerated through a system of color-conscious apartheid that deprived African-
Americans of their fundamental rights.237 However, the instant eradication of racial 
                                                           
 233  See, e.g., Mike Levine, Baltimore on the Brink for Decades, ABC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/baltimore-brink-decades/story?id=30645173 (suggesting that 2015 riots 
in Baltimore arose from “tensions between law enforcement and some of Baltimore's black 
communities . . . .”); Yvonne Wenger, Damage to Business from Baltimore Rioting Estimated at 
About $ 9 Million, WASH. POST (May 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/damage-
to-businesses-from-baltimore-rioting-estimated-at-9-million/2015/05/13/5848c3fe-f9a8-11e4-a13c-
193b1241d51a_story.html (estimating that the destruction caused by the 2015 Baltimore riots 
totaled $9 million in damage for 285 businesses); Becky Yerak, Riot Damage to Ferguson 
Businesses Could Be Covered with Insurance, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-ferguson-business-insurance-1128-biz-20141126-
story.html (reporting that riots in Ferguson, Missouri, caused by a grand jury not charging a white 
officer for shooting a eighteen-year-old black man, may cost $5 million and that twenty-eight 
businesses were reported as burglarized).  
 234  See Orlando Patterson, Race and Diversity in the Age of Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/books/review/Patterson-t.html?_r=0. 
 235  Fisher, 133 S. Ct at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 236  See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (“Classification based on race carry a danger of stigmatic 
harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions 
of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”) 
 237  See GAVIN WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH: REVOLUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN 
ECONOMY SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 19 (1986) (finding that the average slaveholder had at least 
two-thirds of his wealth in African slaves); see also Nathaniel Jones, The Harlan Dissent: The 
Road Not Taken—An American Tragedy, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 957-958 (1996) (“[White 
supremacists recognized Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine] as a license to manipulate, 
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classifications from our laws, either through judicial mandate or through plebiscite, 
cannot erase the social and psychological imprint the legacy of slavery and 
discrimination made upon our country.238 While the nation has made remarkable 
progress in race-relations through de jure desegregation, the enactment of federal 
civil rights legislation, and the election of its first African American to the 
Presidency, racial hostility remains pervasive.239  
The post-Civil Rights Era has had sporadic episodes of racial violence. The 
1960s became a decade in which public order was disrupted by race riots in Watts, 
Detroit, and Newark. The unrest culminated in April 1968 with the assassination of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., which sparked ethnic violence in nearly 110 cities.240 
Regrettably, the modern era is experiencing its share of unrest when racial 
animosities violently erupt in local communities when an event occurs that triggers 
deeply held resentments. These events include the acquittal of four white police 
officers who were video-taped beating an unarmed black motorist,241 the planned 
march by a white supremacist group against claimed black gang activity,242 or the 
conviction of a white transit cop of a lesser charge in the shooting of an unarmed 
black man.243 Racial violence reared its ugly head again in a small Missouri town, 
drawing worldwide attention. In 2014, a shooting by a white police officer of a black 
                                                           
control, and contain blacks. Behind ‘the thin disguise of equal accommodation,’ whites went 
to ridiculous lengths. Hospitals, libraries, drinking fountains, and cemeteries were segregated. 
States hastened to segregate the deaf, mentally retarded, and the blind by color; white nurses 
were forbidden to treat black males. South Carolina forbade black and white cotton workers to 
even look out of the same windows. Florida required African-American textbooks to be 
segregated in warehouses. Atlanta provided ‘Jim Crow Bibles’ for black witnesses in 
courtrooms. The Plessy doctrine was a conduit through which poured the venom of racism 
into every aspect of American life. It infected our social and legal institutions and deeply 
stained the fabric of American thought. A color-blind society we were not.”). 
 238  Orlando Patterson, Equality, DEMOCRACY (Winter 2009), 
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/11/equality. 
 239  See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering school officials to racially desegregate their institutions 
“with all deliberate speed.”); Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Narratives of Identity, 
Nation, and Outsiders Within Outsiders: Not Yet A Post-Anything World, 14 HARV. LATINO L. 
REV. 325, 326 (2011) (explaining that the election of Barack Obama substantiated the view 
among some in media that America was “post-racial” in which race no longer mattered, 
becoming an irrelevant factor in daily interactions and life opportunities). 
 240  Richard Posner, The French Riot’s Comment, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Nov. 13, 2005), 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/11/the-french-riots--posners-comment.html. 
 241  Robert Reinhold, Riots in Los Angeles: The Blue Line; Surprised Police React Slowly 
as Violence Spread, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/02/08/ 
home/rodney-riots.html. 
 242  Planned Neo-Nazi March Sparks Violence, CNN (Oct. 15, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2005/US/10/15/nazi.march/. 
 243  Sean Alfano, Oakland Shooting Verdict Sparks Riots After Johannes Mehserle Dodges 
Murder Rap in Oscar Grant Death, DAILY NEWS (July 9, 2010), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/oakland-shooting-verdict-sparks-riots-johannes-
mehserle-dodges-murder-rap-oscar-grant-death-article-1.464411. 
40https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss3/7
2016] REPLAY THAT TUNE 559 
 
teen sparked multiple days of civil unrest when a grand jury decided to not indict the 
officer.244 The riot resulted in looters burning at least twenty-five buildings in the 
city’s business district.245 Clearly, this demonstrates that race remains a catalyst for 
social angst and disruption.  
Many Americans do not discuss race productively. Citizens often look to 
prominent, and colorful, figures that are anointed by political elites or by the pundit 
class as race leaders for direction in how to discuss or view matters pertaining to 
race. Unfortunately, many of these individuals are not race healers. They are 
arsonists who pour fuel on the social fire.246 Their rhetoric does not provide the 
public with useful vocabulary to facilitate meaningful dialogue; in reality, these 
individuals turn up the verbal heat by evoking rhetoric that substitutes substantive 
disagreement with vicious, race-based insults at times.247 Worse still, a cottage 
industry of radio hosts, television personalities, and even politicians now specialize 
in manufacturing ethnic conflict by injecting divisive speech into political discourse; 
this dynamic is not limited to any political ideology or party.248 
                                                           
 244  The Damage in Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-photos.html. 
 245  Id.  
 246  Labeling individuals who engage in ethnic politics as “arsonists” is a farce borrowed 
from former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani; he characterized those whom he believed 
wrongly racialized the Michael Brown case in Ferguson, Missouri as “racial arsonists.” Rudy 
Giuliani on Darren Wilson Breaking His Silence, FOX NEWS (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2014/11/26/rudy-giuliani-on-darren-wilson-breaking-his-
silence. 
 247  One startling example of a race-based ad hominem insult comes from Civil Rights 
activist Al Sharpton, who has advised the Obama Administration on race relations. Michelle 
Ye Hee Lee, Giuliani’s Claim the White House Invited Al Sharpton Up to 85 Times, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-
checker/wp/2014/12/30/giulianis-claim-the-white-house-invited-al-sharpton-up-to-85-times/ 
(finding that visitors’ logs from the White House recorded that Sharpton visited the residence 
at least seventy-two times). Al Sharpton attacked former New York City Mayor David 
Dinkins with racial epithets: 
David Dinkins, you wanna be the only nigga on television, the only nigga in the 
newspaper, the only nigga who can talk. Don't cover them, don't talk to them, cause 
you got the only nigga problem. Cause you know if a black man stood up next to ya, 
they would see you for the whore you really are!  
Rosella Age, Breitbart.com Holds Up Sharpton Remarks For Scrutiny After Limbaugh Slap, 
DAILY CALLER (Mar. 15, 2012), http://dailycaller.com/2012/03/15/breitbart-com-holds-up-
sharpton-remarks-for-scrutiny-after-limbaugh-slap/. 
 248  See, e.g., Nicole Casta, Savage: Arabs are “Non-humans” and “Racist, Fascist Bigots,” 
MEDIA MATTERS AM. (May, 14, 2004), http://mediamatters.org/research/2004/05/14/ savage-arabs-
are-non-humans-and-racist-fascist/131141; Hilary Crosley, Cornel West: Obama a “Republican in 
Blackface,” THE ROOT (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.theroot.com/buzz/ cornel-west-obama-
republican-blackface (reporting that Professor Cornel West called President Obama “a Rockefeller 
Republican in blackface . . . .”); Tim Graham, Radio Host Mike Malloy Rips Clarence and Ginni 
Thomas and Says Their Marriage Will Inflame Racist 'Teabaggers,' NEWSBUSTERS (Mar. 17, 
2010), http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/tim-graham/2010/03/17/radio-host-mike-malloy-rips-
clarence-and-ginni-thomas-and-says-their-mar (reporting that Radio Host Mike Malloy called 
Justice Clarence Thomas a “House Negro” for his alleged personal support for the Tea Party); Pat 
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Public figures have injected race to disrupt political discourse to either distract 
the public from substantive issues or to achieve some personal agenda. Modern 
audiences have been presented with speakers, from across the political spectrum, 
which weigh into certain controversies as an occasion to engage in “identity 
politics.”249 Politicians, television personalities, and radio show hosts have, either 
through coded words or provocative language, intensified ethnic antipathies in 
notable controversies that exposed racial fault lines. Such controversies include the 
double-murder trial of a former football player;250 the arrest of a black professor 
from Harvard by a white police officer;251 three white, lacrosse players from Duke 
University accused of raping a black escort;252 and the tragic shooting of an unarmed 
black teen by a Latino neighborhood watchmen.253 These events inspire people of 
goodwill to question how this nation can receive relief from persistent racial 
bitterness. These people disagree, however, on what solutions the country should 
adopt. 
Colorblind purists conclude that the nation’s history on race teaches that the 
classification is an inherently toxic category and government activity can only lead 
to the creation of racial entitlements or increased ethnic tensions.254 Total 
government neutrality with respect to race—they conclude—is the best antidote to 
remedy the lingering effects of slavery and discrimination.255 A purely colorblind 
                                                           
Buchanan: In His Own Words, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, 
http://www.adl.org/special_reports/buchanan_own_words/on_immigration.asp (last visited Mar. 8, 
2016) (arguing that America is “committing suicide” because the nation is becoming less white 
with rising minority populations); Jeff Poor, Anti-gun Sports Columnist Jason Whitlock: ‘The NRA 
Is the New KKK,’ DAILY CALLER (Dec. 3, 2012), http://dailycaller.com/2012/12/03/anti-gun-sports-
columnist-jason-whitlock-the-nra-is-the-new-kkk/#ixzz2EAD4C0oX (reporting that columnist 
Jason Whitlock blasted the NRA as the “new KKK” for creating a gun culture, which contributed to 
the murder-suicide committed by NFL star Jovan Belcher and for the arming of black youths); Jake 
Sherman, Andre Carson: Tea Party Wants Blacks “Hanging on a Tree,” POLITICO (Aug. 31. 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0811/62396.html#ixzz2Dhs8y3W3 (“Rep. Andre Carson . . . 
said . . . ‘some of them in Congress right now of this tea party movement would love to see you and 
me . . . hanging on a tree.’”). 
 249  Isaac Simon, Comment, Constitutional Theory Building in the Context of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: The History of Affirmative Action, 23 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 113, 
136 (2002). 
 250  See generally Christo Lassiter, The O.J. Simpson Verdict A: Lesson in Black and White, 
1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 69 (1996).  
 251  See generally Abby Goodnough, Harvard Professor Jailed; Officer Is Accused of Bias, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21gates.html?_r=0. 
 252  See generally Duff Wilson & David Barstow, All Charges Dropped in Duke Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/us/ 
12duke.html?ref=dukelacrossesexualassaultcase. 
 253  See generally Michael Martinez, George Zimmerman Sues NBC Universal Over Edited 
911 Call, CNN (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/06/us/florida-zimmerman-nbc-
lawsuit. 
 254  See e.g., Adarand Constr. Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 255  Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747-48 (2007). 
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approach, these theorists contend, “ensures that policy deliberations are not infected 
with either racial stereotyping or racial politics.”256 Moreover, complete racial 
neutrality provides a better chance for citizens from different backgrounds to co-
exist together. Colorblindness encourages citizens to support an ideology of “deep 
humanism” over “identity politics” in recognizing that “there is something, under the 
skin, common to all human beings.”257 In order to achieve racial harmony, colorblind 
purists propose that the federal and state constitutions should prohibit government 
decision-makers from considering race as a basis for dispensing benefits or 
privileges.258 The movement toward strict racial neutrality has gained popularity in 
the country, with some surveys showing that the public is strongly opposed to racial 
preferences.259 
Eight states banned preferential treatment for any person on the basis of race with 
respect to, among other areas, public education and thus prohibited race-conscious 
affirmative action programs in colleges and universities.260 But this movement 
toward total racial neutrality in these states has not become the panacea for 
combating racial hostility as colorblind purists had hoped. An in-depth analysis of 
hate-crime statistics and bias incidents on college campuses reveal that there are as 
many incidents on campuses in states that ban race-conscious programs than there 
are on campuses in states that permit it.261 Racially inspired hate crime statistics 
reported in California by the Federal Bureau of Investigation illustrate this point.  
                                                           
 256  Kuykendall & Adside, supra note 114, at 1050. 
 257  Simon, supra note 249, at 136. 
 258  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 357 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke and the Court’s decision today rest on the fundamentally flawed 
proposition that racial discrimination can be contextualized so that a goal, such as classroom 
aesthetics, can be compelling in one context but not in another. This ‘we know it when we see 
it’ approach to evaluating state interests is not capable of judicial application.”). 
 259  See Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Most Reject Considering Race in College Admission: 
Sixty-seven Percent Say Decisions Should Be Based Solely on Merit, GALLUP (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163655/reject-considering-race-college-admissions.aspx; 55% 
Oppose Affirmative Action for College Admission, RASMUSSEN REP. (Feb. 26, 2012), 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/february_2012/55_
oppose_affirmative_action_policies_for_college_admissions; U.S. Voters Disagree 3-1 with 
Sotomayor on Key Case, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Most Say Abolish 
Affirmative Action, QUINNIPIAC U. (June 3, 2009), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/news-and-
events/quinnipiac-university-poll/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=1307 (finding that fifty-
five percent of those surveyed say affirmative action should be abolished.). But see Simon 
Waxman, Poll: Yes to Affirmative Action, No to Racial Preferences, BOS. REV. (Aug. 9, 2013), 
http://www.bostonreview.net/blog/poll-yes-affirmative-action-no-racial-preferences. 
 260  Drew DeSilver, Supreme Court Says States Can Ban Affirmative Action; 8 Already 
Have, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/04/22/supreme-court-says-states-can-ban-affirmative-action-8-already-have (noting 
that Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and 
Washington have adopted formal bans on racial and other preferences).  
 261  Appendix B provides a comparative analysis between racially motivated hate crimes 
statistics occurring on college campuses in affirmative action states and campuses in non-
affirmative action states. Informed by data provided by the United States Department of 
Education, the Appendix examines the validity of claims made by colorblind purists who 
assert that race-conscious government activity breeds hostility and resentment among those 
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College campuses in states that ban affirmative action, much like other colleges 
across the country, experience racial incidents that captivate public attention and 
contribute to the verbal lexicon on race, unearthing social activities that are usually 
practiced underground. In recent years, administrators had to respond to a series of 
hip-hop themed fraternity parties where primarily white attendees wear stereotypical 
clothes and create online posts that use so-called African-American vernacular, or 
Ebonics, to parody “black culture.”262 Other incidents include the hazing of a black 
student, which received national media coverage, when his white roommates 
caricatured him as a slave figure, using racial slurs and physical assaults to humiliate 
him.263 When this conduct becomes the subject of public scrutiny, college 
administrators are expected to respond to the controversy immediately, formulating 
strategies that can identify root causes and implement solutions to address them.264 
 Colleges need more innovative ideas to address racial problems on campuses, 
particularly when students engage in behavior that counteracts diversity programs 
that increase the presence of underrepresented minorities on campus. For instance, 
there is a body of research finding that the claimed educational benefits that arise 
from student body diversity are inhibited by a social phenomenon where students 
segregate themselves along racial lines.265 In this environment, racial tensions are 
                                                           
who feel harmed by programs that favor minorities. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). I sincerely thank Ross N. MacPherson for his collaboration on this Appendix. His 
research and insight assisted my endeavor to make a meaningful contribution to the 
affirmative action debate. I am also grateful to Odirichi Kanu for providing a fresh pair of 
eyes on this Appendix in assessing the accuracy of both the statistical models employed along 
with the claims made. 
 262  See, e.g., Kate Abbey-Lambertz, “Hood Rachet Thursday” Party at University of Michigan 
Fraternity Canceled By School, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/11/01/hood-ratchet-thursday-party-theta-xi-u-ofm_n_4190523.html (noting a Facebook event 
page posted by a fraternity at U-M about a “Hood Ratchet Thursday” party, which extended 
invitation to “rappers, twerkers, gangsters (no Bloods allowed), thugs, basketball players, bad 
bitches, ratchet pussy”); Sara Hamedy, Arizona State Fraternity Suspended After MLK-themed 
Party Mocks Blacks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-
78986719/ (describing a themed fraternity party in which attendees wore baggy basketball jerseys 
and baseball caps worn backwards while drinking from watermelon cups); Fraternity and Sorority 
at McDaniel College Spark Outrage After Organizing ‘Racist’ ‘CMT V. BET’ Party, DAILY MAIL 
(Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2575898/Fraternity-sorority-McDaniel-
College-spark-outrage-organizing-racist-CMT-vs-BET-party.html (reporting about a CMT and 
BET party where guests wore baggy pants and chains); Two Students at Lee University Attend 
Party in Blackface, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.jbhe.com/2013/11/two-
students-at-lee-university-attend-party-in-blackface/ (posting that two women attended a rap-
themed party and wore blackface and baggy white T-shirts). 
 263  3 Calif. Students Charged With Hate Crimes Expelled, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 
3, 2014), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_25691097/3-calif-students-charged-hate-crime-
expelled (reporting that San Jose University expelled three students for alleged hate crimes 
against their black roommate).  
 264  See generally Tanzina Vega, Colorblind Notion Aside, Colleges Grapple With Racial 
Tension, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/us/colorblind-
notion-aside-colleges-grapple-with-racial-tension.html. 
 265  See MICHAEL BOCIAN, HOUSING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES: SELF-SEGREGATION, 
INTEGRATION, AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES 4-5 (1997) (explaining that those who advance an 
integrationist model towards campus life believe that programs that encourage racial 
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easily heightened because racial groups are alienated from one another outside the 
classroom.266 While studies suggest that black students perform better academically 
when they live with black roommates or participate in African-American student 
groups, the claimed educational benefits that black students experience are 
outweighed by diminished opportunities for interracial problem solving caused by 
self-segregation.267 
Alienation, not always familiarity, breeds contempt. Self-segregation leads to 
“polarization among racial groups.”268 Ethnic divisions are intensified when a 
racially charged event occurs on campus. Meaningful interracial dialogue in this 
environment is rare because students, who have limited interracial interactions 
outside the classroom, lack the social skills needed to solve racial problems.269 Some 
researchers found that racially charged events cause white students, whose ethnic 
identity has been historically linked to racial oppression, to distance themselves from 
minority students to avoid controversial discussions that may result in them being 
labeled as racist.270 This avoidance can further “exacerbate racial tensions by 
validating and reaffirming racial/ethnic minority students’ perceptions of the campus 
climate and assumptions about their [white] peers’ racial attitudes. In addition, 
avoidance might prevent necessary parties from engaging in a constructive dialogue 
concerning the incident.”271 Racial isolation does not only limit opportunities for 
                                                           
separatism have the “negative consequence of tribalizing society” and “amplifies racial 
divisions and tension.”); see also Darnell Cole, Do Interracial Interactions Matter? An 
Examination of Student-Faculty Contact and Intellectual Self-Concept, 78 J. HIGHER EDUC. 
249, 274 (2007) (finding that interracial interaction does not necessarily occur at the same rate 
for all groups on a diverse campus and that “direct institutional intervention” is needed to 
encourage interracial interaction among white students at predominantly white institutions); 
Kuykendall & Adside, supra note 114, at 1076-81 (identifying university-sponsored programs 
or activities that encourage students to voluntarily self-segregate along racial lines with 
respect to social interactions and housing choices).  
 266  Jennifer C. Brooks, The Demise of Affirmative Action and the Effect on Higher 
Education Admissions: A Chilling Effect or Much Ado About Nothing, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 567, 
584-85 (2000) (“Many minority students seek solace from others like them in the form of 
minority student organizations, thus beginning the process of minority separatism across the 
nation's college campuses. Minority self-segregation consequently leads to an atmosphere of 
omnipresent racism on campus.”). 
 267  See BOCIAN, supra note 265, at 5 (citing to integrationist theorists who contend that 
self-segregation creates “‘ethnic enclaves’ encouraged by universities engender polarization 
among racial groups.”). But see id. at 10 n.22 (mentioning studies that found that blacks who 
live with other black students and participate in black student groups graduate at higher rates 
than those who do not). 
 268  Id. at 5. 
 269  Willis Hawley, Cross-Racial Understanding and Reduction of Racial Prejudice, 
TEACHING TOLERANCE, http://www.tolerance.org/sites/default/files/general/Cross-
Racial_Understaning_and_Reduction_of_Racial_Prejudice.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
 270  Andrew Howard Nichols, Campus Racism and White Stereotype Threat: Implications 
for Campus Racial Climates and Interracial Interactions Among Students 4 (May 2009) (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Pennsylvania State University).  
 271  Id. at 5. 
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interracial dialogue but it can also diminish the quality of intra-racial conversations 
about race. 
The racially polarized campus creates “racial enclaves” that students occupy.272 
Social pockets on campus characterized by race can be intellectually restrictive, 
particularly for minorities.273 The free expression and exploration of ideas, which is 
the hallmark of higher education, can be a potentially rare experience for minority 
students.274 Because minority participation takes place in small and insular 
communities on campus, conversations occur in an echo chamber where groupthink 
is internally policed.275 “Groupthink attempts to control its members, often through 
self-appointed regulators, by branding dissenters with verbal scarlet letters, singling 
them out for shunning or disrespect if they dare stray from group orthodoxy.”276 As a 
consequence, an authoritarian pall hovers over conversations about race, sending the 
ominous message to dissenters to either toe the ethnic line or keep silent. 
Questioning the status quo can result in group members stigmatizing the dissenter as 
a race traitor.277 Educational innovations, focused on interracial exchanges, are still 
needed in this area to break social monopolies on conversations on race. Bakke 
provides the public with choices as it evaluates the effectiveness of the overall 
diversity enterprise in their respective states.  
B. Bakke and Leaving the Door Open to Innovation. 
In Grutter, Justice Kennedy concluded that Bakke opened the door to 
experimentation in the field of diversity programs designed to increase the presence 
of underrepresented groups and improve racial health on campuses, while providing 
individual consideration for each applicant as mandated by the Constitution.278 But 
racial diversity is not the ends but rather a means to an end. The ultimate goal of 
diversity programs is to manifest the educational benefits that arise from campus 
diversity. Informed by amici from the United States military and major corporations, 
Justice O’Connor found that the educational benefits that flow from campus 
diversity were “substantial,” such as breaking down racial stereotypes and creating 
an environment that provides the opportunity for “livelier, more spirited” classroom 
discussion when campus demographics reflect “the greatest possible variety of 
                                                           
 272  BOCIAN, supra note 265, at 5.  
 273  Kuykendall & Adside, supra note 114, at 1078. 
 274  Id. at 1078-79. 
 275  Id. at 1079 n.392. 
 276  Id. at 1080. 
 277  Id. at 1079 n.393 (explaining a perspective on groupthink in the context of black 
America). Consider the following as an example of the negative effects that can arise from 
groupthink, where an MSNBC commentator labeled an African-American politician as a race 
traitor for supporting a political party that is not supported by the majority of black 
Americans. Toure: Arthur Davis is like ‘Judas in a Suit’, THE CYCLE (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://video.msnbc.msn.com/thecycle/48728988#48728988 (disparaging former Democratic 
Congressman Arthur Davis for changing his party affiliation from Democrat to Republican by 
calling him a “Judas in a suit and tie,” a “Republican trophy,” and a “black apostate.”). 
 278  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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backgrounds.”279 Since Fisher I made clear that lower courts must evaluate how 
these programs operate in practice, colleges again received the constitutional green 
light to implement novel ways that will manifest educational benefits. Appendix C 
outlines race-conscious or race-neutral proposals developed by scholars designed to 
increase campus diversity that colleges and institutions can consider. These 
proposals can inspire diversity bureaucracies to find ways to diversify campuses in a 
way that targets applicants who can enhance student body diversity, while avoiding 
major constitutional problems. 
A purely colorblind approach, however, would impose a constitutional freeze on 
innovation by withdrawing from the public any consideration of proposals designed 
to address the root causes of racial resentment. In so doing, colorblind purity would 
take away from citizens the opportunity to persuade one another about solutions to 
improve race relations through regular democratic means. Considering all the 
historical problems this nation has experienced with respect to race, this Article 
asserts that all constitutional options should remain on the table. Strict colorblind 
constitutionalism would, as reflected in referenda on the subject, limit citizen choice 
to a rigid “yes” or “no” on the question.280 Nor should the Court afford state actors 
                                                           
 279  Id. at 330. 
 280  The Constitution does not, however, preclude states from barring its public institutions 
from considering race in its decision-making processes. In Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means 
Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2013), the Court upheld Proposition 2, a ballot initiative 
approved by Michigan voters, which broadly amended the state’s constitution to ban race-
conscious government activity and thus prohibited state universities and colleges from 
considering race in its admission decisions. Id. at 1638. Ballot measures of this kind are 
contrary to the aspirations advanced in this Article. Nevertheless, Proposition 2 is part of a 
long tradition where citizens, responding to Supreme Court decisions, have afforded 
themselves more protections or rights than what the federal constitution provides. At the state 
level, voters and legislatures have passed measures to grant themselves rights and protections 
in a variety of areas, such as education, the death penalty, doctor-assisted suicide, and eminent 
domain. See Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ 
Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241 (2001) (“Nearly every state constitution requires 
the state to provide its children with an education.”); see also Mark Berman, There Are 18 
States Without the Death Penalty. A Third of Them Have Banned it Since 2007, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/04/30/there-are-
18-states-without-the-death-penalty-a-third-of-them-have-banned-it-since-2007; Physician 
Assisted Suicide Fast Facts, CNN LIBR. (Jun. 2, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/26/ 
us/physician-assisted-suicide-fast-facts/ (noting that five states permit doctor-assisted suicide 
for terminally-ill patients); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political 
Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2102 (2009) (“Forty-three states have enacted post-
Kelo reform legislation to curb eminent domain. The Kelo backlash probably resulted in more 
new state legislation than any other Supreme Court decision in history.”). In prior decisions, 
the Court held that the Constitution did not recognize any liberty interests in these areas, 
motivating political action on the state level. See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
(holding that due process does not recognize a right to education); Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
allows the government to transfer private property to another private owner so long as the 
property is used for “economic development.”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997) (holding that the due process clause does not recognize a right to doctor assistance 
while committing suicide); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that states can 
impose death penalty provided it afforded certain procedural guarantees). If the people can 
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deference and presume they act in “good faith” when they experiment with racial 
classifications.  
But there is a dark cloud over affirmative action jurisprudence. The opinions 
written by the Court’s race ideologues play like a funeral dirge. Each side hopes for 
the day when it will receive an additional vote for its position, so it can bury Bakke 
in the grave.281 That day may come when the Court decides Fisher II, I hope it will 
not be a cloudy one for the doctrine of stare decisis and for race relations. 
CONCLUSION 
Racism lingers and influences our young people today. This is reflected in self-
segregation on college campuses, in bias incidents, and in racial upheaval in 
American cities. The stakes are high. The margin for error is low. The dream of 
racial tranquility is on the line.282 Bakke provides the prospect for innovations that 
will combat racism. Democratic institutions should take the lead on these efforts and 
not the judiciary.  
The political process should produce solutions to problems, which it is better 
suited to solve. Race is such a problem in the area of higher education. Race 
ideologues desire to change affirmative action jurisprudence but that ship has long 
since sailed. Bakke is now firmly entrenched in both the Free Speech and the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
The decision engendered institutional reliance among the nation’s leading 
colleges. States invest millions of dollars each year to operate diversity 
bureaucracies that implement programs designed to maintain diversity. Student 
groups cultivate a culture in which they organize events that foster social cohesion 
                                                           
grant themselves greater protections on these issues, then surely they can pass referenda, 
which shields them completely from racial discriminatory practices that are presumptively 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. However, Schuette, does not conflict with 
Bakke. In Schuette, the plurality explained that the Constitution leaves the door open to debate 
on racial preferences: “Voters might likewise consider, after debate and reflection, that 
programs designed to increase diversity—consistent with the Constitution—are a necessary 
part of progress to transcend the stigma of past racism.” Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638. So 
voters may consider programs at colleges and universities designed to produce campus 
diversity in which race may play an important role in that endeavor; thus, the Court’s race 
jurisprudence permits innovation in higher education and does not make the judiciary 
complicit in the effort to take from society all the constitutional options afforded to them 
under Bakke.  
 281  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(noting that he joined the majority opinion, because the petitioner did not ask the Court to 
reverse its ruling in Grutter, where the Court held that diversity constituted a compelling state 
interest to justify racial preferences in admission programs); see also id. (Thomas, J. 
concurring) (arguing that he would rule that “a State’s use of race in higher education 
admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.”). But see id. 
at 2434 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that she would affirm the race-conscious admission 
program without vacating the case to the lower court, because “the University reached the 
reasonable, good-faith judgment that supposedly race-neutral initiatives were insufficient to 
achieve, in appropriate measure, the educational benefits of student body diversity . . . .”). 
 282  See Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), 
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1951-/martin-luther-kings-i-have-a-dream-speech-august-28-
1963.php.  
48https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss3/7
2016] REPLAY THAT TUNE 567 
 
among minority students. Diversity is integral to the educational mission and identity 
of colleges and universities. Reversal would produce widespread disruption. These 
institutions would have to allocate additional expenditures to restructure 
multicultural offices and revise entrenched admission, recruitment, and hiring 
practices to comply with a new legal regime. Bakke has proven workable, offering 
clear guidance to lower courts in how to identify practices that make race the 
dominant factor in admission decisions. But the Court must resist the temptation to 
constitutionalize its preferred theory on race.  
Whenever the Court jettisoned basic legal principles to impose its racial theories 
on society, it has led to disastrous results. Our country’s history of race slavery,283 
race apartheid,284 and race-based exclusions are regrettable reminders.285 History 
shows that when the Court weighs into the political thicket it exacerbates ideological 
disagreements. As Justice Scalia aptly wrote in his dissenting opinion in Casey,  
[B]y foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue 
arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all 
participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an 
honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead 
of allowing for . . . differences, the Court merely prolongs and intensifies 
the anguish.”286 
I strongly agree with Justice Scalia’s view that the Court should remain agnostic 
on hot button issues. In vigorous dissents, he criticized the Court for picking sides in 
the “culture wars” for striking down abortion regulations and anti-sodomy laws.287 
However, I wish that colorblind purists who pontificate from the pulpit of judicial 
restraint on cultural issues would practice what they preach on race.  
Bakke is entitled to deference under the doctrine of stare decisis. A federal rule, 
mandating either a strictly colorblind approach or deference to government actors, 
would either foreclose opportunities for innovation or permit unbridled uses of race 
among college administrators. The Court should, therefore, replay its doctrinal 
                                                           
 283  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that blacks are not United States 
citizens), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.”).  
 284  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the detention of persons 
of Japanese ancestry did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it served military 
necessities). 
 285  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S 537 (1896) (holding that separate but equal public 
accommodations on the basis of race did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.), overruled 
by Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 286  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 287  See id. (“We should get out of [the area of abortion regulation], where we have no right 
to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any good by remaining.”); see also 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 603-04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603-04 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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symphony in this area. It will encourage society to sit at the “table of brotherhood” 
and strike the chord of racial harmony.288 
                                                           
 288  See King, supra note 282. 
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APPENDIX A 
Indiana University “The Bloomington campus is 
committed to full diversity, academic 
freedom, and meeting the changing 
educational and research needs of the 
state, the nation, and the world.”289 
University of Illinois Urbana-
Champagne  
“As the state’s premier public 
university, the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign’s core mission is to 
serve the interests of the diverse people 
of the state of Illinois and beyond. The 
institution thus values inclusion and a 
pluralistic learning and research 
environment”290 
University of Maryland  “Diversity, equity and excellence are 
core values of the Division of Student 
Affairs educational mission which is to 
maximize the potential of students by 
cultivating their personal, social and 
intellectual development.”291 
University of Nebraska Core Values: “Diversity of ideas and 
people.”292 
Mississippi State University  “The information and resources 
provided on this website are intended to 
familiarize members of the campus and 
global community with the University's 
commitment to promote a diverse and 
inclusive working and learning 
environment. We strive for diversity and 
inclusion where all voices, viewpoints, 
and backgrounds are valued and 
supported.”293 
University of Tennessee  “But diversity means more than race 
and ethnicity; it’s about moving beyond 
just tolerance to a place of understanding. 
                                                           
 289  IU Bloomington – Campus Mission Statement, IND. U., http://trustees.iu.edu/resources/ 
mission-statements/iu-bloomington-mission-statement.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).  
 290  Resolution on Diversity Values Statement, U. IL., http://diversity.illinois.edu/ 
SupportingDocs/Diversity%20Values%20Statement.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 291  Student Affairs: Diversity, U. MD., http://www.studentaffairs.umd.edu/diversity (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
 292  Role and Mission, U. NEB., http://www.unl.edu/about-unl/role-mission/ (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2016).  
 293  Diversity @ MSU, MISS. ST. U., http://www.oidi.msstate.edu/diversity/ (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2017). 
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Approaching differences in political 
views, religion, gender identity, values, 
age, abilities, and sexual orientation with 
an open mind helps get us there.”294 
University of Iowa “The Office of Equal Opportunity and 
Diversity (EOD) supports a campus 
environment where each individual's 
ideas, contributions, and goals are 
respected and valued. EOD is charged 
with implementation of equal 
opportunity, affirmative action, and 
diversity policies at the University of 
Iowa.”295 
Harvard University “Mission is advancing inclusion, 
diversity and equal opportunity.”296 
Purdue University “Diversity Achieving it within our 
faculty, staff, and student body is one of 
Purdue Engineering's foremost 
initiatives.”297 
Dartmouth University “Many cultures, one community. At 
Dartmouth, differences are embraced and 
ideas are challenged. Our diverse 
community of students, faculty, and staff 
come together to share perspectives, 
learn, and grow.”298 
Princeton University "Having a diversity of perspectives is 
crucial for excelling in our mission of 
teaching and research.”299 
Cornell University “A diverse community includes 
everyone and is the foundation for the 
meaningful exploration and exchange of 
ideas. Since its founding, Cornell 
University has encouraged a culture that 
provides for the full participation of all 
members of our campus community—
                                                           
 294  Diversity, U. TN. KNOXVILLE, http://www.utk.edu/diversity/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2017). 
 295  Equal Opportunity and Diversity, U. IOWA, http://diversity.uiowa.edu/office/equal-
opportunity-and-diversity (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
 296  Institutional Diversity and Equity, HARV. U., http://diversity.harvard.edu/ (last visited 
Feb 17, 2016).  
 297  Diversity in Engineering, PURDUE U., https://engineering.purdue.edu/ 
EEE/InfoFor/Partnerships/Diversity (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).  
 298  Life & Community: Diversity, DARTMOUTH, http://dartmouth.edu/life-community/ 
diversity (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 299  Diversity & Inclusion, PRINCETON U., http://campuslife.princeton.edu/diversity-
inclusion (last visited Feb. 18, 2106). 
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this keeps us at the leading edge in 
education and in our fields and 
practices.”300 
Columbia University “Columbia is committed to creating 
and supporting a community diverse in 
every way: race, ethnicity, geography, 
religion, academic and extracurricular 
interest, family circumstance, sexual 
orientation, socioeconomic background 
and more.”301 
Brown University “Diversity is at the foundation of 
Brown's academic enterprise. Exposure to 
a broad range of perspectives, beliefs, and 
outlooks is key to fostering both breadth 
and depth in intellectual knowledge.”302 
Yale University “Yale seeks to attract a diverse group 
of exceptionally talented men and women 
from across the nation and around the 
world and to educate them for leadership 
in scholarship, the professions, and 
society.”303 
University of Pennsylvania “Understanding and appreciating 
diversity is fundamental to success in 
today's world and one of Penn's most 
important priorities.”304 
Auburn University “Diversity at Auburn University 
encompasses the whole of human 
experience and includes such human 
qualities as race, gender, ethnicity, 
physical ability, nationality, age, religion, 
sexual orientation, economic status, and 
veteran status.”305 
University of Georgia  “The mission of the Office of 
Institutional Diversity (OID) is to lead a 
                                                           
 300  University Mission, CORNELL U., http://www.cornell.edu/about/mission.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 301  Diversity, COLUM. U. UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS, 
https://undergrad.admissions.columbia.edu/learn/studentlife/diversity (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).  
 302  Exploring Diversity at Brown, BROWN U., http://www.brown.edu/academics/college/ 
orientation/exploring-diversity-brown (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 303  Presidential Search Statement, YALE U., http://presidential-search.yale.edu/sites/ 
default/files/Yale%20Presidential%20Search%20Statement.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 304  Mission of the University, U. PENN., http://www.upenn.edu/almanac/ 
agenda.html#mission (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 305  About Diversity at Auburn, AUBURN U., https://cws.auburn.edu/diversity/pm/about (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
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focused institutional effort to evaluate 
existing programs and develop new 
initiatives to support diversity and equity 
at the University of Georgia.”306 
Louisiana State University “Diversity is fundamental to LSU's 
mission and the University is committed 
to creating and maintaining a living and 
learning environment that embraces 
individual difference. Cultural inclusion 
is of highest priority.”307 
University of Arkansas “Diversity Affairs works to enhance 
educational and professional diversity by 
seeking to integrate individuals from 
varied backgrounds and characteristics 
such as those defined by race, ethnicity, 
national origin, age, gender, veteran, 
religion, disability, sexual orientation, 
socioeconomic background and 
intellectual perspective.”308 
University of Florida “Together with its undergraduate and 
graduate students, UF faculty participate 
in an educational process that links the 
history of Western Europe with the 
traditions and cultures of all societies, 
explores the physical and biological 
universes and nurtures generations of 
young people from diverse backgrounds 
to address the needs of the world's 
societies.”309 
Texas A&M University  “To fulfill its multiple missions as an 
institution of higher learning, Texas 
A&M encourages a climate that values 
and nurtures collegiality, diversity, 
pluralism and the uniqueness of the 
individual within our state, nation and 
world.”310 
Vanderbilt University  "Vanderbilt is about striving for 
                                                           
 306  Diversity at UGA, U. GA., https://www.admissions.uga.edu/diversity (last visited Feb. 
18, 2016). 
 307  Diversity Statement, LA. ST. U., http://www.lsu.edu/diversity/about_us/diversity-
statement.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 308  Diversity Affairs, U. ARK., http://diversity.uark.edu (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).  
 309  University of Florida Mission Statement, U. FL. http://www.registrar.ufl.edu/ 
catalog1011/administration/mission.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 310  Commitment Statements, TEX. A&M U., http://diversity.tamu.edu/What-is-
Diversity/Commitment-Statements (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
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excellence. Diversity of backgrounds, 
ideas and approaches helps us get 
there."311 
University of South Carolina “The University of South Carolina, as 
the state’s flagship. University, has a 
unique and diverse history. Today, as we 
move this University forward, we can 
reflect tremendous progress this 
University has made in promoting 
diversity by our actions and our deeds”312 
University of Mississippi “The University of Mississippi 
provides an academic experience that 
emphasizes critical thinking; encourages 
intellectual depth and creativity; 
challenges and inspires a diverse 
community of undergraduate, graduate, 
and professional students; provides 
enriching opportunities outside the 
classroom; supports lifelong learning; 
and develops a sense of global 
responsibility.”313 
University of Kentucky “The Office for Institutional Diversity 
strives to promote campus-wide diversity 
initiatives, empowering colleges, schools, 
major units, and student-led organizations 
to develop their own programs and 
strategies. While collaborating with the 
many different and varied diversity 
efforts, the OID hopes to bring about a 
greater sense of community and 
involvement at the University of 
Kentucky.”314 
University of Missouri  “The Office of the Chancellor’s 
Diversity Initiative (CDI) is centrally 
located in S303 Memorial Union external 
link on the University of Missouri 
campus in Columbia, Mo. Throughout 
the University our staff integrates 
diversity and inclusion through 
                                                           
 311  Diversity, VAND. U., http://admissions.vanderbilt.edu/life/diversity.php (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2016). 
 312  Celebrating Diversity, U. S.C., https://sc.edu/eop/diversity.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 
2016). 
 313  Vision, Mission, and Core Values, U. MISS., http://www.olemiss.edu/aboutum/ 
mission.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 314  Campus Diversity Initiatives, U. KY., http://www.uky.edu/Diversity/initiatives.html 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
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collaborative partnerships, leadership, 
expertise, and resources to further MU's 
strategic goals.”315 
APPENDIX B 
Do College Campuses That Ban Race Conscious Affirmative Action Programs Have 
Better Racial Climates Than Campuses With Race-Conscious Admission Programs? 
A. Colorblind Constitutionalism 
Colorblind constitutionalism is a potent theory in the Court’s race jurisprudence, 
which exposes ideological rifts among the Justices as reflected in the spirited 
opinions offered in the Court’s affirmative action cases. With Justice Scalia’s sudden 
death, there are now four Justices who would adopt a race-neutral approach to 
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause.316 But there are maybe three Justices who 
would dispense with Bakke entirely and apply a strictly colorblind approach to 
evaluating admission policies.317 While Justice Kennedy would not reverse Bakke, he 
did emphasize the use of race-neutral alternatives in Fisher I.318 These Justices 
would enforce a colorblind approach to some varying degree. The genesis of the 
colorblind constitution theory can be traced to the lone dissenting opinion in Plessy 
v. Ferguson where Justice Harlan declared that: “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind 
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”319 The theory is informed 
by an exegetical analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment.320 But colorblind purists 
include in their legal analysis a sociological assessment on how color-conscious 
activity instigates racial tensions.  
Justice Powell argued, without any empirical data, that such activity developed 
hostility within many citizens in order to refute the claim that discrimination against 
whites was harmless. “All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and 
benefits on the basis of race,” Justice Powell wrote, “are likely to be viewed with 
deep resentment by the individuals burdened. The denial to innocent persons of 
equal rights and opportunities may outrage those so deprived, and therefore may be 
perceived as invidious.”321 Such a view is echoed by Philosophy Professor Carl 
Cohen of the University of Michigan, who remarked, in regard to Michigan’s ban on 
race-based affirmative action plans, that “when you don’t have preferences, the 
atmosphere is healthier . . . you just don’t hear any expressions of resentment that 
                                                           
 315  Mission and Vision, MIZZOU DIVERSITY, http://diversity.missouri.edu/about/mission-
vision.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 316  Eric Lewis, Five Justices in a Bubble: The Court’s Step Back on Race, NEW YORKER 
(June 26, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/five-justices-in-a-bubble-the-
courts-step-back-on-race. 
 317  See supra note 14. 
 318  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
 319  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 320  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 321  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978). 
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you did hear from time to time in the old days.”322 The view that all racial 
discrimination is harmful, regardless of what race is burdened, motivated voters in 
some states to ban race-conscious government activity, beginning with California in 
1996.323 
Colorblind purists now have eight states where their theory on race relations has 
been adopted as law.324 The claim that race-conscious activity creates an 
environment of racial hostility can be tested. Assuming color-blind purists are 
correct that race-conscious policies, like affirmative action programs, increase racial 
tensions, then it would follow that those campuses with race-neutral policies would 
foster a more racially harmonious campus environment as compared to campuses 
with race-conscious policies. In an effort to scrutinize the veracity of this claim, we 
use data on hate crimes that occur college campuses provided by the Department of 
Education from 2009-2013 to measure whether there is a significant difference in 
racial tensions between campuses that implement race-based admission programs 
from campuses that ban them.325 
Measuring racial prejudice is a challenging task to be sure. Bigoted views are 
often held privately and rarely voiced beyond closed doors; because students may 
conceal racial resentments, it is difficult to fully construct the racial climate on a 
given campus. However, criminal activity is recorded by the government and 
identifies the most salient racial hatreds that are present in places like college 
campuses. Thus, we chose hate crimes as a metric to provide insight into the state of 
race relations at these universities.326  
B. Methodology 
To develop a data set that compared incidences of hate crimes between states that 
ban and states that allow affirmative action, we accessed data provided by the Office 
                                                           
 322  Greg Stohr, Black Enrollment Falls As Michigan Rejects Affirmative Action, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-
24/black-enrollment-falls-as-michigan-rejects-affirmative-action. 
 323  DeSilver, supra note 260. The following states have banned race-conscious affirmative 
action programs: Arizona (2010), California (1996), Florida (1999), Michigan (2006), 
Nebraska (2008), New Hampshire (2011), Oklahoma (2012), Washington (1998). 
 324  Halley Potter, What Can We Learn from States that Ban Affirmative Action?, CENTURY 
FOUND. (June 26, 2014), http://www.tcf.org/work/education/detail/what-can-we-learn-from-
states-that-ban-affirmative-action.  
 325  The Database of Accredited Postsecondary Institutions and Programs, U.S. DEP’T 
EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/Search.aspx [hereinafter The Database] (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2016). 
 326  Rebecca Stotzer & Emily Hossellman, Hate Crime on Campus: Racial/Ethnic Diversity 
and Campus Safety, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 644, 648 (2011), 
http://jiv.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/27/4/644.full.pdf+html (explaining 
research which found that surveys on hate crimes may undercount the rate of bias incidents on 
college campuses). Although hate crimes statistics maybe an imperfect metric for measuring 
racial tensions—as we discuss in the limitations section—we use them in this instance to 
represent the level of racial tensions on campuses because “[c]ases of ‘campus ethnoviolence’ 
are the clearest depiction of the “relationships between groups in the community and the level 
of tension between those groups.” Id. 
57Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
576 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:519 
 
of Postsecondary Education of the Department of Education.327 That office provides 
instances of arrests for hate crimes on college campuses receiving Title IV funding 
for federal student aid. The data comes from allegations of criminal activity reported 
to campus security or local law enforcement.328 Since certain criminal reports were 
processed by campus security, which is supervised by the university instead of the 
government, the reported numbers differ from those reported in the FBI Uniform 
Crime Report.329 The numbers have been processed into three categories: (1) average 
number of hate crimes per year from 2009-2013, (2) student population, and (3) 
average number of hate crimes per 10,000 students per year.330 The average number 
of hate crimes per year from 2009-2013 represents the number of hate crimes that 
were either racially or ethnically motivated that took place on-campus, in on-campus 
housing, in non-campus buildings frequently used by students, and on property 
owned by the educational institution.331 This data includes the following crimes that 
manifested evidence that the perpetrator selected the victim because of racial 
prejudice: “murder, non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault, 
simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of 
property.”332 Let us now explain how we conducted our analysis.  
We begin collecting data for the purposes of this study in 2009 because the 
Department of Education began collecting and presenting its data in its current 
                                                           
 327  See The Database, supra note 325. 
 328  Id. 
 329  Id. 
 330  See Appendix B infra at 574-75. 
 331  See generally The Campus Safety and Security Data Analysis Cutting Tools: Glossary 
of Terms, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov/security/glossaryPopup.aspx [hereinafter 
Glossary of Terms] (follow “O” hyperlink). On-campus crime refers to those crimes that take 
place in “any building or property owned or controlled by an institution within the same 
reasonably contiguous geographic area and used by the institution in direct support of, or in a 
manner related to, the institution's educational purposes, including residence hall,” or a 
building “that is owned by the institution but controlled by another person, is frequently used 
by students, and supports institutional purposes (such as a food or other retail vendor).” Id. 
On-campus housing facilities are those buildings that are “owned or controlled by the 
institution, or is located on property that is owned or controlled by the institution, and is 
within the reasonably contiguous geographic area that makes up the campus is considered an 
on-campus student housing facility.” Id. The term non-campus buildings includes “Any 
building or property owned or controlled by an institution that is used in direct support of, or 
in relation to, the institution's educational purposes, is frequently used by students, and is not 
within the same reasonably contiguous geographic area of the institution.” Id. (follow “N” 
hyperlink). Public property broadly refers to “thoroughfares, streets, sidewalks, and parking 
facilities, that is within the campus, or immediately adjacent to and accessible from the 
campus.” Id. (follow “P” hyperlink). 
 332  Id. (follow “U” hyperlink) (“Hate crimes must be classified using the F.B.I.'s Uniform 
Crime Reporting Hate Crime Data Collection Guidelines and Training Guide for Hate Crime 
Data Collection.”); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HATE 
CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES & TRAINING GUIDE FOR HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION 
Appendix A (2015), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime-data-collection-
guidelines-and-training-manual.pdf. 
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format in that year.333 Using data provided by the department, we added the student 
populations of all the public colleges and universities for each state, selecting those 
schools classified as “public, four-year or above” institutions. 334 Beginning in 2009 
until 2013, we then totaled all racially motivated crimes 335 from the available data 
for hate crimes occurring "on campus", in "on-campus student housing facilities", in 
"noncampus" locations, and on "public property."336 In so doing, we found the total 
number of hate crimes in a given year. To find the average number of hate crimes 
per year between 2009 and 2013, we averaged these totals during that timeframe.337 
We then employed the following formula to find the average number of hate crimes 
per 10,000 students: take each state's average number of hate crimes for 2009-2013 
and divide that number by that state's student population, and then multiply that 
number by 10,000 (average number of state hate crimes for 2009 - 2013 ÷ state 
student population x 10,000).  
We calculated the average number of hate crimes per 10,000 students to control 
for significant population variations that exist between the states, so we may 
compare states of various student population sizes to measure where there is the 
greatest likelihood for a hate crime to occur (for example, California has over two 
million public college and university students, while Wyoming only has one public 
university).338 For a more detailed explanation on how to access data from the 
department website as well as direction on how to calculate the data consult the 
following footnote.339 The Appendix organizes the metric in charts, so that the data is 
provided in a reader-friendly format. 
                                                           
 333  Prior to 2009, the Department did not separately recognize simple assault, larceny, 
intimidation, or destruction of property/vandalism crimes. Instead, these crimes were 
ostensibly included as an “other crime”, but we cannot be sure that these crimes were tallied. 
In an effort to maintain a consistent analysis, we decided only to include the years 2009-2013 
where the classifications of crimes are identical. 
 334  The Database, supra note 325 (follow “Institution State or Outlying Area” field; then 
follow “Type of Institution” field). 
 335  The department classified racially motivated hate crimes in the following categories 
“murder/non-negligent manslaughter, sex offenses-forcible, sex offenses—non-forcible, 
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, arson, simple assault, larceny-theft, 
intimidation, and destruction/damage/vandalism of property” in its data collection. See id. 
 336  See supra text accompanying note 331. 
 337  See infra Appendix B. 
 338  Once we downloaded hate crime files for each category for a selected state, we added 
the number of hate crimes and divided the total number of hate crimes by five in order to 
attain the average number of hate crimes per year between 2009 and 2013. That number is 
divided by the total student population in that state and then multiplied by 10,000 to account 
for significant variation in student populations between the states. See infra Appendix B 
(presenting the average number of hate crimes per 10,000 students for states that allow 
affirmative action and those that do not).  
 339  See The Database, supra note 325 (follow “Institution State or Outlying Area” field; 
then follow “Type of Institution” field). In order to calculate the total student population in 
each state, we selected each stated individually in the “Institution State or Outlying Area” 
field and then selected “Public, 4-year or above” option as the type of institution we aimed to 
focus on for purposes of our analysis. When those options were selected in those fields, we 
then totaled the enrollments for each public-4 year institution to attain the student population 
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We divided the data into two groups. One group represents those states that ban 
affirmative action, and the other are states that permit such programs. This allowed 
us to compare the frequency of hate crimes on affirmative action campuses from 
non-affirmative action ones. Our analysis comes with two caveats, however. First, 
California’s inclusion in our hate crimes calculus might give that state 
disproportional weight in our formula and may slant the results in favor of non-
affirmative action states. This point will be explained in more detail in Section D of 
the Appendix. Second, three states, Arizona, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma, appear 
in both groups because those jurisdictions banned affirmative action during the 
2009-2013 timeframe.340 Those three states contribute to the statistics of those states 
with affirmative action until the year the practice was banned in that state. The charts 
providing the average number of hate crimes per 10,000 students each year for 
affirmative action and non-affirmative states are provided below. The Appendix then 
concludes with our analysis of the data gathered. 
C. Findings 
States that Ban Affirmative Action 
 
State 
 
Average Hate Crimes 
Per Year 2009-2013 
 
Student 
Population 
Average Number 
of Hate Crimes Per 
10,000 Students 
Per Year 
Arizona 3.4 135,141 0.251589081 
California 49.4 6,778,966 0.072872471 
Florida 6.2 637,797 0.097209614 
Michigan 9.6 305,454 0.314286276 
Nebraska 2.4 59,389 0.40411524 
New Hampshire 2.8 28,056 0.998003992 
Oklahoma 3 102,796 0.291840149 
Washington 4.8 179,895 0.266822313 
Total 81.6 8,227,494 0.099179653 
 
                                                           
for each respective state. Once student enrollments for each state was ascertained, then we 
selected “continue” and clicked 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 to retrieve the crime files 
for the campuses in the state we selected. Then under “Select a Category” we clicked and 
downloaded individual files for “Hate Crimes” that occurred in the following categories: on-
campus, on-campus Student Housing Facilities, Noncampus, and public property. See The 
Campus Safety and Security Data Analysis Cutting Tools: Download Data for a Group of 
Campuses, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov/security/GetAggregatedData.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016). 
 340  DeSilver, supra note 260. 
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States that Allow Affirmative Action 
 
 
State 
Average Number of 
Hate Crimes Per Year 
2009-2013 
 
Student Population 
Number of Hate 
Crimes per 10,000 
Students Per Year 
Alabama 0.8 165,439 0.048356192 
Alaska 0.8 29,525 0.270956816 
Arizona 3 135,141 0.221990366 
Arkansas 1.2 97,705 0.122818689 
Colorado 6.2 173,441 0.357470264 
Connecticut 4.2 65,039 0.645766386 
Delaware 0 26,502 0 
Georgia 3.2 308,650 0.103677304 
Hawaii 0 30,486 0 
Idaho 1.8 51,635 0.348600755 
Illinois 6.6 194,913 0.338612612 
Indiana 17.8 237,145 0.750595627 
Iowa 2.2 74,862 0.293874062 
Kansas 0.6 102,674 0.058437384 
Kentucky 4.2 126,535 0.331923974 
Louisiana 1.8 235,060 0.076576193 
Maine 3.2 31,383 1.019660326 
Maryland 12.8 162,722 0.786617667 
Massachusetts 2.4 123,892 0.193717108 
Minnesota 11.8 136,044 0.86736644 
Mississippi 0 79,708 0 
Missouri 4.4 149,329 0.294651407 
Montana 0.6 39,145 0.15327628 
Nevada 0.8 91,334 0.087590602 
New Hampshire 1.6 28,056 0.570287995 
New Jersey 16.6 192,214 0.863620756 
New Mexico 1 64,647 0.154686219 
New York 27.6 356,939 0.773241366 
North Carolina 2.8 220,120 0.127203344 
North Dakota 7.2 41,729 1.725418774 
Ohio 0 282,518 0 
Oklahoma 0.8 102,796 0.07782404 
Oregon 1.6 105,140 0.152178048 
Pennsylvania 20.4 270,915 0.75300371 
Rhode Island 3 25,087 1.195838482 
South Carolina 3.6 107,733 1.195838482 
South Dakota 4.2 38,027 1.104478397 
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State 
Average Number of 
Hate Crimes Per Year 
2009-2013 
 
Student Population 
Number of Hate 
Crimes per 10,000 
Students Per Year 
Tennessee 3 139,579 0.214932046 
Texas 5 567,626 0.088086169 
Utah 0.4 148,417 0.026951091 
Vermont 0.4 19,652 0.203541624 
Virginia 3.4 215,370 0.157867855 
West Virginia 10.4 70,303 1.479310982 
Wisconsin 15.8 180,618 0.874774386 
Wyoming 0 12,778 0 
Total 213.8 5,792,580 0.099179653 
 
These numbers show that there is an average of 0.099179653 hate crimes per 10, 
000 students each year on college campuses that ban affirmative action and an 
average of 0.369092874 hate crimes per 10,000 students each year on college 
campuses that allow affirmative action. Comparatively, there are 3.72 times more 
hate crimes on affirmative action campuses than campuses that ban affirmative 
action programs. We will proceed to place these findings in context.  
D. Limitations 
Perhaps, hate crimes are slightly less prevalent in schools that ban affirmative 
action programs simply because fewer minorities are admitted into those 
universities. Absent preferential treatment in the admissions process, some minority 
applicants may no longer qualify for admission. This is certainly the case at some of 
the most selective universities. For instance, black student enrollment at the 
University of Michigan declined significantly after voters passed Proposal 2, which 
banned affirmative action in 2006.341 That year 7.1% of the student population was 
African American.342 In 2014, the university reported that only 4% of the student 
body was black.343 Michigan State University experienced a similar decline in black 
enrollment. Over ten percent of its incoming class was black in 1999 but now 
African Americans make up a lower percentage of incoming freshman classes at 
State.344 In 2006, 8.8% of freshman class was black; the percentage of black 
freshman at State fell to 7.5% in 2013.345  
                                                           
 341  Stohr, supra note 322. 
 342  Id. 
 343  Compare Ethnicity and Gender for Term 1610 (Fall 2006), U. MICH., 
http://ro.umich.edu/report/06fa816.pdf (showing Michigan’s black enrollment at 7.1% in 
2006), with Ethnicity Reports, U. MICH. OFF. REGISTRAR, http://ro.umich.edu/enrollment/ 
ethnicity.php?limit=none#r816 (follow “816: Enrollment by School or College, Location, 
Ethnicity, and Gender” hyperlink) (showing Michigan’s black enrollment at 4 % in 2014). 
 344  Stohr, supra note 322. 
 345  Id. 
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California experienced the same phenomenon with respect to black enrollment. 
While more Latinos are now admitted into California public universities at a greater 
proportion than whites, black representation at California public universities 
plummeted to 4.2% in 2013. 346 While scholars disagree over whether the presence 
of racial minorities in significant numbers catalyzes or reduces racial tensions on 
college campuses, that discussion may not fully explain why non-affirmative action 
campuses have slightly less hate crimes.347 Perhaps an outlier state, which may 
present a comparatively more positive racial climate on non-affirmative action 
campuses, can explain this result.  
California’s student population may carry disproportionate weight in our study. 
In fact, public colleges and universities in that state alone supply more than two-
thirds of the banned affirmative action population.348 Removing California from the 
hate crime calculus for non-affirmative action jurisdictions might provide statistics 
that are more representative of the frequency of hate crimes that occur on campuses 
in those jurisdictions. Below we have provided an alternative table, which calculates 
the number of hate crimes without California.  
 
States that Ban Affirmative Action without California 
 
 
State 
 
Average Hate 
Crimes Per Year 
2009-2013 
 
Student Population 
Average Number of 
Hate Crimes Per 
10,000 Students Per 
Year 
Arizona 3.4 135,141 0.251589081 
Florida 6.2 637,797 0.097209614 
Michigan 9.6 305,454 0.314286276 
Nebraska 2.4 59,389 0.40411524 
New Hampshire 2.8 28,056 0.998003992 
Oklahoma 3 102,796 0.291840149 
Washington 4.8 179,895 0.266822313 
Total 28.2 1,448,528 0.194680393 
 
As the table indicates, colleges that ban affirmative action experience an average 
of 0.194680393 hate crimes per 10,000 students. In contrast to our initial calculation, 
which showed 3.72 times more hate crimes on affirmative action campuses, when 
                                                           
 346  See Miriam Jordan, Hispanics Gain at California Colleges, University System Admits 
More Latinos Than Whites for First Time, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303825604579514030158706454; see also 
Sharon Bernstein, Black Students Lagging in Admission to University of California, REUTERS 
(Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/06/us-usa-california-
raceidUSBRE9B504120131206. 
 347  See Stotzer & Hossellman, supra note 326, at 647-50, 654-57 (explaining the 
competing viewpoints on the effects that diversity has on racially motivated hate crimes on 
college campuses). 
 348  See Table: States that Ban Affirmative Action, supra Appendix A,. (showing 6,778,966 
out of 8,227,494 students were from California). 
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California is taken out of the calculus, affirmative action campuses have only 1.90 
times more hate crimes than non-affirmative action campuses.  
E. Conclusion and Analysis 
From the data presented above, we found that there is no strong correlation 
between prohibiting race-conscious affirmative action programs and decreased 
incidences of reported hate crimes on college campuses. At first glance, the data 
shows that affirmative action universities have nearly four times the amount of 
racially motivated hate crimes per 10,000 students each year than universities that 
ban such programs. Yet, a closer examination of these figures reveal that the 
difference in the levels of racial violence between these campuses is actually de 
minimis when analyzed over a marked period of time and calculated without 
identified outliers that likely skewed our initial findings. As explained before, 
California’s inclusion into the hate crimes calculus may provide an inaccurate 
depiction of race relations on non-affirmative action campuses, since it makes up 
two-thirds of the student population for those colleges. Non-affirmative action 
campuses, in fact, experience two or three times more hate crimes than campuses in 
California. 349 
With California factored into the equation, a non-affirmative action university 
with an undergraduate program of approximately 20,000 students can expect to 
experience a hate crime roughly once every five years over a twenty-year period. 350  
                                                           
 349  From 2009-2013, California campuses experiences 0.072872471 hate crimes per 
10,000 students while other non-affirmative action campuses in other states experience 
0.194680393 hate crimes in that same time period. Consequently, non-affirmative action 
campuses in other states experience 2.67 times more hate crimes than non-affirmative action 
campuses in California. See infra Appendix B. 
 350  Our ideal university with 20,000 students is not the exact average for undergraduate 
enrollments in the United States. Undergraduate enrollments vary widely across the country 
depending upon the reputation, and exclusiveness, of the institution. Exceedingly competitive 
admission plans, for example, may produce student populations with only a few thousand 
students. See Facts About Brown, BROWN U., http://www.brown.edu/about/facts (citing that 
Brown University had 6264 undergraduates in 2014); see also Yale “Factsheet”, YALE U., 
http://oir.yale.edu/yale-factsheet#FallEnrollment (posting that Yale had 5,453 
undergraduates). Some universities attain large undergraduate enrollments with over 30,000 
students. See About Florida State, FL. ST. U., https://www.fsu.edu/about/students.html 
(reporting that approximately 31,000 undergraduate students were enrolled at the university in 
2010); see also Class Profile, IND. U., http://admissions.indiana.edu/education/class-
profile.html (36,419 students in undergraduate program in Fall 2014). Of course, university 
populations fall between these two extremes with many undergraduate enrollments ranging 
from over 10,000 to under 30,000 students. See Enrollment, U. MICH., 
http://ro.umich.edu/enrollment/enrollment.php (follow “101: Comparative Enrollment by 
School or College and Gender : Winter 2015” hyperlink) (posting that University of 
Michigan-Ann had 18, 713 undergrads in Winter 2015); see also Enrollment Statistics, 
AUBURN U., http://bulletin.auburn.edu/generalinformation/enrollmentstatistics/#all (declaring 
25,912 undergraduate students at Auburn in Fall 2014); University Facts: Cornell by the 
Numbers, CORNELL U., https://www.cornell.edu/about/facts.cfm (reporting that Cornell had 
14, 393 undergraduate students). We chose 20,000 as the most typical size for a fairly, large 
undergraduate population. 
  We made the following calculations to find the average number of hate crimes for a 
non-affirmative action college with 20,000 undergraduate students within a twenty-year time 
 
64https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss3/7
2016] REPLAY THAT TUNE 583 
 
Affirmative action campuses appear to have significantly higher rates of hate crimes 
in comparison, with an incident occurring about once every year and a half.351 But 
there is more to these findings than meets the eye. In fact, the hate crime formula 
reveals that the frequency of racially motivated violence on non-affirmative action 
campuses is not much better than campuses with race-conscious admissions plans 
when it is revised to account for any statistical outliers.  
When California is removed from the calculation, we found that the frequency of 
hate crimes on campuses banning affirmative action more than doubled, bringing the 
gap in the frequency of hate crimes between both groups significantly closer. In this 
revised calculation, non-affirmative action campuses experience a hate crime once 
every two and a half years, instead of one every five years as originally found.352 
This finding places the claimed impact of affirmative action programs on racially 
motivated crimes at college campuses into better focus. The practical difference 
between the two campuses is that an affirmative action campus may experience a 
hate crime during an academic year when a non-affirmative action campus may not. 
353 This difference is likely too small to prove any sort of correlation between the 
implementation of affirmative action and incidences of hate crimes. Thus, we cannot 
confirm the claim, advanced by colorblind purists, that race-conscious activity is the 
impetus for racial hostility. Additionally, our findings do not conflict with research, 
which suggest that diversity may actually reduce interracial tensions and produce 
positive educational outcomes.354 
The Appendix does not, however, intend to minimize hate crimes through our 
comparative analysis. All hate crimes have the same pernicious effect upon 
individual victims and society, regardless as to where they occur. In reality, hate 
crimes are acts of terrorism, “because they cause reverberating harms, not only to the 
                                                           
period. Take the average number of hate crimes per 10,000 students and multiply by two and 
then again by 20. In this case: 0.099179653 x 2 x 20 = 3.96. See infra Appendix B. In 
practical terms, on average non-affirmative action campuses have a hate crime one every five 
years during a twenty-year time period. 
 351  Using the formula explained in supra note 350, we found the average number of hate 
crimes per 10,000 students on affirmative action campuses in a twenty-year timeframe: 
0.369092874 x 2 x 20 = 14.76. See infra Appendix B. 
 352  As indicated in supra note 390, non-affirmative action campuses experience 3.96 hate 
crimes over a twenty-year period or roughly one hate crime 350 five years. When California is 
not factored into the calculation, non-affirmative action campuses experience 7.797 or about 
eight hate crimes during that period. These campuses thus experience at least one every two 
and a half years. See supra Appendix.A, Table, States that Ban Affirmative Action without 
California. 
 353  As we have found, affirmative action campuses experience a hate crime once every 
year and a half, whereas non-affirmative action states, excluding California, have an incident 
once every two and a half years. Taking the difference between these two groups, we estimate 
that in any given academic year a non-affirmative action state will not experience racial 
violence but an affirmative action campus will.  
 354  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (citing to research finding that 
campus diversity creates vibrant classroom interaction among students and improves overall 
racial health); see also Stotzer & Hossellman, supra note 326, at 654. 
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victim, but also to members of the broader community.”355 Racially-motivated 
crimes are “aimed towards those groups of people who have traditionally held the 
least amount of power, in order to send the message that those victims are, and will 
continue to be, ‘stigmatized and marginalized’ by society.”356 Still, the country is at a 
loss as it seeks to address persistent ethnic resentments.  
While the federal government and nearly every state has enacted anti-hate crimes 
legislation, allowing federal and local prosecutors to pursue racially-motivated 
crimes, statutory law in this area does not answer the broader public policy question 
on what theory should the government adopt to ease racial tensions.357 These 
tensions can lead to violence. Strict colorblind constitutionalism presents itself as an 
antidote to racial resentment and accuses race-conscious activity by the state as 
being an instigator of racial antagonism.358 This Appendix does not lend any 
statistical support to moralistic claims made against government implementation of 
racial classifications.  
Color-blind purists have yet to empirically prove that affirmative action is the 
driver of racial resentment, as reflected in the insignificant difference between the 
frequency of racial violence on non-affirmative action and affirmative action 
campuses. Absent a larger data set that demonstrates a greater divide between 
schools implementing affirmative action and schools banning it, the assertion that 
racial preferences increases ethnic resentment appears to be based more on heated, 
moral objections than research.359 Because purely colorblind approaches to 
                                                           
 355  Kami Chavis Simmons, Subverting Symbolism: The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, 
Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act and Cooperative Federalism, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1863, 
1890 (2012). 
 356  Id. at 1890. 
 357  Id. at 1874-75. 
 358  Simon, supra note 249, at 136.  
 359  The claim that affirmative action causes many citizens to feel wronged by racial 
preferences has merit. The government cannot penalize citizens for arbitrary reasons; due 
process requires that deprivations “bear some relation to individual responsibility or 
wrongdoing.” Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). The Nobility and 
Bill of Attainder Clauses support the principle that individuals should be awarded or punished 
for reasons based solely on their own conduct. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of 
Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); id. art. I., § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility 
shall be granted by the United States.”); id. art. I., § 10, cl. 1 (No State shall . . . grant any 
Title of Nobility.”); id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of 
Blood.”); id. art. IV, § 4 (The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government.”); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 239 (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 747, 770 (1999). Affirmative action critics believe that racial preferences turn the 
rules of fair play on their head. Racial preferences burden individuals that had nothing to do 
with past injustices, they argue. White and Asian applicants, many of them politically 
powerless teenagers, suffer discrimination, so colleges can experiment with race. As a result, 
rejected applicants from non-favored groups may feel anger towards beneficiaries of racial 
preferences. However, the Fourteenth Amendment does not contain an Anti-Resentment 
Clause. No case measures racial antagonism as a way to evaluate the constitutionality of 
challenged admission programs. Constitutional law must rest on stronger grounds than on the 
hurt feelings shared by those who oppose affirmative action.  
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admission plans have not been proven to produce campus environments with 
comparatively more racial peace than campuses with color-conscious plans, the 
public should reject policies designed to ban all race-conscious programs at public 
universities.  
APPENDIX C 
 
Race-Conscious or Race-Neutral 
Proposal 
 
Description 
 
 
Student-Led Race-Conscious 
Admission Programs and Diversity-
Oriented Learning Communities 
Colleges may establish “a experimental 
residential college, created to establish 
learning communities and set 
pedagogical goals around racial 
awareness . . . .”360 Admissions offices 
will offer seats to applicants who meet 
minimum standards and submit an essay 
describing how their racial background as 
well as personal qualities will be 
“important in an overall evaluation of 
how she will contribute to the learning 
community goals.” 361 These 
communities can insulate the admissions 
process from attempts by administrators 
to achieve racial balancing by restricting 
consultation of admission data and by 
permitting students to participate in 
admission decisions. 362 “Student 
participation in admissions programs,” 
two scholars wrote “is an effective means 
to counterbalance administrators who 
may taint the program with race-based 
theories or paternalistic attitudes.”363 
Such programs can also serve as a social 
petri dish in which interaction between 
students can inspire new ideas that can 
establish programs that can either enrich 
the learning community or can be 
employed into larger programs that 
facilitate dialogue between the races 
campus-wide.364  
 
                                                           
 360  Kuykendall & Adside, supra note 114, at 1081. 
 361  Id. at 1084. 
 362  Id.  
 363  Id. at 1087. 
 364  See id. 
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Race-Conscious or Race-Neutral 
Proposal 
 
Description 
 
Race-Conscious Financial Aid 
Programs 
An offer of admission into a college or 
university may not be enough to entice a 
student with “diversity- enhancing 
characteristics” to enroll; 365 therefore, 
“[t]he further inducement of financial aid 
based on the applicant's value may be 
both necessary and desirable.”366 To 
remain Bakke complaint, the program 
should consider race-neutral 
characteristics, such as a candidate’s 
“occupational experiences, adversities 
overcome, family history, social and 
economic class . . . to demonstrate how 
they would contribute meaningfully to 
the diversity of the institution.”367 Race 
can be also considered as a factor when 
awarding financial aid, because extending 
an offer of admission does not provide a 
meaningful representation of minority 
students alone. Minority applicants must 
choose to attend in a meaningful way. “A 
significant factor effecting students' 
choices of which institution to attend is 
the award of financial aid,” one scholar 
wrote, “[i]n this way, achieving . . .. 
[meaningful minority representation] is 
as much a factor of financial aid as it is a 
factor of admission.”368  
 
 
Diversity-Oriented Scholarships 
Universities have implemented race or 
diversity-conscious scholarship programs 
that follow Bakke as well. For instance, 
Vanderbilt University has the 
Chancellor’s Scholarship, which 
identifies applicants with a “deep-seated 
commitment to diversity and social 
justice.” 369 Scholarship recipients are 
                                                           
 365  Thomas J. Graca, Diversity-Conscious Financial Aid After Gratz and Grutter, 34 J.L. & 
EDUC. 519, 526 (2005). 
 366  Id. at 525. 
 367  Id. at 526-27. 
 368  Id. at 528.  
 369  Merit Scholarship Opportunities: Chancellor’s Scholars, VAND. U., 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/scholarships/chancellor.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
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Race-Conscious or Race-Neutral 
Proposal 
 
Description 
expected to serve as diversity agents on 
campus because of their past commitment 
to interracial collaboration. “Chancellor's 
Scholars have worked to build strong 
high school communities by bridging 
gaps among economically, socially, and 
racially diverse groups and have 
demonstrated significant interest in issues 
of diversity education, tolerance, and 
social justice. Chancellor's Scholars are 
expected to build upon these earlier 
commitments through continued active 
engagement in academic and leadership 
opportunities at Vanderbilt.”370 
Diversity-Conscious Certification 
Programs 
The program guarantees admission to 
students from partner high schools or 
undergraduate programs that enrolled in 
pre-approved courses offered by the 
partner school, attained a competitive 
GPA, or earned a particular score on a 
standardized text. 371 Such programs can 
serve as pipelines for underrepresented 
minorities to attain admission into elite 
universities, particularly if the program 
partners with schools with majority-
minority student bodies. 
 
  
                                                           
 370  Id.  
 371  See generally Earn Your Undergraduate and Law Degree in Six Year: 3 + 3 Legal 
Education Admission Program, MICH. ST. U. C. L., https://www.law.msu.edu/admissions/ 
GVSULEAPPoliSci.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (exemplifying graduate schools that have 
partnered with undergraduate programs to grant automatic admission to students who earn a 
competitive GPA, obtain a minimum score on a standardized test, or satisfy other program 
specific requirements).  
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